The contradiction of opposites in Shakespeare Sonnets by Etkin, Jan
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Contradiction of Opposites in 
Shakespeare’s Sonnets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
        M.Phil. 
        University of Birmingham 
        July 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
Contents 
 
 
Abstract        3 
 
Chapter 1        4- 21 
 
Footnotes.              22 -23 
 
 
Chapter 2        24-52 
 
Footnotes        53-56 
 
 
Chapter 3               57-86 
 
Footnotes        86-88 
 
 
Chapter 4             89-118 
 
Footnotes.           120-123 
 
 
Chapter 5         123 - 137 
Footnotes            138-  140 
 
 
Works Cited.         141 - 148   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Abstract. 
 
The aim of research is an examination of the contradiction of opposites in 
Shakespeare’s sonnets. The method used was to examine the contradiction within 
the lines of poetry as well as a paradoxical meaning between the lines and then 
between the couplet and quatrains within a sonnet.  Finally the meaning between 
individual sonnets was contrasted.  The basic assumption of the research is that a 
dream and a poem are a similar form of thinking.  Both dream and poem weave the 
contradiction between external and internal reality into a new composite whole, which 
transforms objective reality into a subjective experience. This transformation is 
carried out by metaphor or condensation and displacement or metonymy. This 
makes the latent reading of the sonnet like the dream seditious whereas by contrast 
the manifest level reveals what is normatively desired and this gives the sonnet its 
ambiguous or indeterminate meaning. The findings of the research were that 
although the sonnets never state what love is they create a view of love which is 
paradoxical; on the one hand love is idealized and on the other denigrated. It is this 
conflict, which resonates with readers because in love people hold contradictory 
views of themselves and others.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
The Contradiction of Opposites in Shakespeare’s Sonnets. 
 
 
 
 
 
“What quality went to form a Man of Achievement especially in Literature & which 
Shakespeare possessed so enormously – I mean Negative Capability, that is when 
man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts without any irritable 
reaching after fact and reason.”  Keats, J. Letters to John Keats. 21-27 Dec 1817.i  
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A painting called the The Ambassadors by Hans Holbein the younger (1533) hangs 
in the National Gallery in London.  If a person looks at the low foreground of the 
painting there is a shape that from one perspective looks like an elongated disc but 
from another perspective of this same painting this same disk appears to be a skull 
or a memento mori.  This visual equivocation describes the cognitive experience of 
paradox.  Paradox unsettles the mind as it calls into question intellectual stability.  It 
articulates this is a skull; this is a disk.  This according to Quinne ii is Grelling’s 
paradox, “It is and it is not”.  “Para” implies beyond received opinion and through 
opposites the equivalence of contraries is established.  Ironically the more mad it is 
the more wise it becomes.  If the reader resists the urge to harmonize the 
equivocation and ambiguity this doubleness can be seen to reflect the world-view as 
it is rather than as common conventional opinion would like to have it as a 
continuous smooth text that reaches a coherent and unambiguous firm conclusion.  
The Poet of Shakespeare sonnets both in his plays and in his sonnets reflects an 
equivocal world view both as it is and how we would like it to be or feel it ‘ought’ to be.  
For Instance, Henry V answers Catherine equivocally, “But in loving me, you should 
love the friend of France, for I love France so well that I will not part with a village of 
it..” (Act 5. Sc.2. 170-176.)iii.   
 
 
In this fashion the Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets calls into question common or 
received opinion by presenting both the manifest received opinion and the opposing 
contradictory opinion.  The Poet achieves this through the use of contradictory 
rhetorical strategies and poetic lines, which contradict one another.  This ambiguity 
introduces a latent subversive undertone in his sonnets.  In so doing he expands and 
challenges or even dismantles the social belief systems that constitute the world-
view of his plays and poems making them appear seditious if not dangerous.  
Paradox in a poem is designed to render the poem’s meaning indeterminate which 
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makes every sonnet open to a range of interpretation between orthodoxy and 
sedition.  This is apparent in Sonnet 20 where the oxymoron or the contradictory 
meaning of “Master-Mistress” (20.2.) highlight the effect of the contradictory 
gender theme in the poem. This is apparent where “Master-Mistress” (20.2) 
represents the contradictory gender connotations of the poem, whilst the chiasmus, 
“When most I wink then do mine eyes best see,” (43.1) emphasize the logic of the 
illogicality of being able to experience a truth or see clearly whilst dreaming.  On the 
other hand the Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets also alludes to the irrational but 
common belief that the mind is split from the body, “My life, being made of four, with 
two alone / Sinks down to death, oppressed with melancholy” (45.7-8) and the 
paradox produced through the reversal of word order in the chiasmus “But, ah, 
thought kills me that I am not thought.” (44.9).   Contradiction in Shakespeare’s 
sonnets also occur between the lines of the poetry in the same poem, “Let me 
confess that we two must be twain / Although our undivided loves are one;” (36.1-2).  
There can also be a contradiction between the themes of different sonnets or from 
one sonnet to the next; as in Sonnet 115, “Those lines that I before have writ do lie, / 
Even those that said I could not love you dearer,” (115.1).  This contrasts with “Let 
me not to the marriage of true minds / Admit impediments, love is not love / Which 
alters when it alteration finds,” (116. 1-3).  
 
 
Central to this opposition is the difference between the manifest level of the poetry, 
which portrays what is idealized or the normatively expected received opinion as 
opposed to the latent level, which conceals the clandestine desire.  This ambiguity 
disrupts and reverses the generally held conformist view making of Shakespeare’s 
poetry wayward and unsettling.  This is apparent in Sonnet 135 where the pun on 
Will stands both for a sexual organ and the name of the Poet, “Think all but one, and 
me in that one Will.” (135.14).  M. H. Abrams writing in 20th Century Literary Criticism 
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A Reader (1953. 1-28) iv quotes Philip Sidney who defended poetry’s ability to assert 
truth through a kind of lying by invoking paradox, “Now, for the Poet, he nothing 
affirms and therefore neuer lyth.  For as I take it, to lye is to affirm that to be true 
which is false.  The trueth poetry is the most feigning.”v  
 
 
Selected sonnets of the Shakespearean Sonnets in this thesis are glossed through 
the prism of Freudian Psychoanalysis.  This first chapter briefly lays down all the 
theoretical concepts and themes, which underpin and which will be applied in the 
discussion of the sonnets.  A cornerstone of this thesis is that the poem or sonnet 
resemble Freud’s psychoanalytic concept of the dreamvi.  In the first instance this is 
because both sonnet and dream are self-contradictory. The manifest level of the 
poem like the manifest dream support the idealized conventional wisdom of ‘ought to 
be like’ and ‘should be like’ or ‘it is’ whilst the latent interpreted reading reveal the 
enclosed wish or desire of the dream or poem which is directly opposed to its 
manifest reading and articulates, ‘it is not’.  This distortion is carried out in order to 
evade the moral censure of the Superego.  The misleading misrepresentation is 
carried out by the unconscious processes of condensation (S.E. 5. 661.), 
displacement (S.E. 4. 305)vii indirect representation (S.E.14. 228)viii and secondary 
elaboration (S.E. 5. 666).  Thereafter the workings and characteristics of the 
unconscious mind are examined and this leads on to a consideration of the principal 
difference between metaphor and symbolism.  Sonnet 43 is considered in order to 
demonstrate unconscious processes at work in the Poet’s metaphorical 
representation of a dream and the way in which paradox or contradiction in the mind 
or ‘it is’ and ‘ it is not’ is revealed in both poem and dream.  The chapter next goes on 
to consider the relationship between literary analysis and psychoanalysis through 
Jakobson’s concept of The Metaphoric and Metonymic poles (1997.79) ix .  Here 
Jakobson discusses the linguistic relationship of metaphor and metonymy to the 
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structure of the primary process and demonstrates how unconscious processes of 
the mind are used in all forms of self-expression from the ordinary to the creative.  
Empson in Seven Types of Ambiguity (1930.234)x puts forward the proposition that 
ambiguity or doubleness of meaning is not just a rhetorical strategy but is the 
outcome of the split or dissociation in the mind of the Poet between self and other, 
conscious and unconscious and social conventional wisdom as opposed to personal 
desire.  The final paragraph concludes by reviewing the analogical relationship 
between textual ambiguity and visual equivocation and the difference between the 
Freudian version of the signifier and signified or unconscious thing presentation and 
conscious word presentation. 
   
 
In the Interpretation of Dreams (1900) and again in his lectures on the 
“Unconscious”(1915. p.f.l. 11.167-216)xi  Freud described what he believed to be the 
origins of the unconscious and the rules, which govern its operation and its 
impulsivity towards expression in consciousness.  The unconscious is only 
accessible via its manifest representation in consciousness.  This includes dreams or 
slips of the tongue and subjective states of mind like love, hate and mourning, Art or 
in symptoms.  Freud understood the contents of the unconscious were organized 
differently from conscious thoughts and he termed the rules governing the 
unconscious as the primary process.  Free-flowing energy in the system unconscious 
seek an identification between different perceptions whereas the rules governing 
consciousness or the secondary process require an equivalence between ideas.  In 
the system conscious energy is bound and pleasure is delayed by contrast to the 
system unconscious where energy is described as mobile and free-flowing.  This 
loose plasticity renders immediate satisfaction of pleasure an imperative.   
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Unconscious thoughts go through a transformation or distortion before they are 
accessible to consciousness.  Primary process concerns the rules of the process that 
govern that transformation.  These rules disguise unacceptable or traumatic 
unconscious ideas, which can only be understood through a process of interpretation.  
Freud understood four fundamental rules that guide the dream-work or this process 
of transformation.  The first is displacement.   This allows an apparently insignificant 
idea or object to be invested with great intensity, which originally belonged elsewhere.  
This displacement takes place because consciousness responds to intense feelings 
– such as aggression, hate, or sexual longing towards an authority or loved object as 
unacceptable.  These thoughts undergo repression. Jakobson refers to this 
mechanism of displacement as metonymy.  Displacement binds together incongruent 
phantasies by establishing a connection between words whose relationship both in 
terms of form and content are not obvious.  Condensation on the other hand can be 
seen in terms of what Jakobson views as metaphor or symbolism.  In the 
unconscious, thoughts that are contradictory make no attempt to do away with each 
other but persist side by side.  They often combine to form condensations just as if 
there were no contradiction between them or arrive at compromises that our 
conscious thoughts would never permit.  Condensation is therefore another way in 
which unacceptable thoughts pushing through into consciousness are disguised.  It 
also accounts for the fact that the manifest content of a dream or a poem is generally 
smaller than its latent or interpreted content.  Another aspect of the dream-work is 
what Freud addressed as considerations of representability.  Here dreams represent 
words in figurative form as images.  Freud thought that this was the most interesting 
part of the dream-work, for instance an eminent person or an authority figure is 
represented as visually sitting in a high chair.  In this way words in dreams become 
representation of things.  All dreams are subject to secondary revision, which is an 
attempt by the dreamer to organize, revise and establish connections in the dream to 
make its account intelligible.  Freud’s distinction between the manifest and the latent 
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content is important.  The work that transforms latent thoughts into the manifest 
dream content is called dream-work. This includes condensation, displacement, 
secondary-revision and consideration of representability.   
 
 
The work that operates in the opposite direction that seeks to move from the 
manifest content to the latent thoughts is the work of interpretation.  The manifest 
content is what the dreamer remembers.  The latent content is what gives the dream 
its meaning which is reached through interpretation.  The process of interpretation 
allows access to the wish concealed in the dream, which takes the shape of an 
hallucinatory wish fulfillment.  The dream itself does not think or create but presents 
an action inside the dream.  The content of the dream is constituted from thoughts 
from the previous day, which are condensed and displaced onto an infantile wish in 
the unconscious.  In this model desire itself becomes the main source of functioning 
for the unconscious.  In his work Freud searched for normal thought, which had been 
repressed and transformed by the work of the primary process.   
 
 
Freud compared the work of the interpretation to a rebus or picture puzzle made up 
of a mixture of pictographic phonetic and ideographic elements each of which 
required translation.  In Linguistics the rebus principle means using existing symbols 
such as pictograms purely for their sounds and regardless of their meaning to 
represent new words. Many ancient writing systems used the rebus principle to 
represent abstract words, which otherwise would be hard to be represented by 
pictograms.  An example that illustrates the Rebus principle is the representation of 
the sentence "I can see you" by using the pictographs of ‘eye—can—sea—ewe.’  
Freud found that by replacing each syllable with an element or a word a sense of the 
whole can be arrived at.  In every dream there is a core or navel, which is 
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inaccessible and this renders the interpretation of the dream and the poem 
indeterminate.  Like metonymy, unconscious or contiguous association is expressed 
through the method of free association. Here a person is encouraged to say the first 
thing that comes into the mind.  Through inference and deduction the network of 
condensed disguised associations is expanded or revealed.  The Unconscious is 
also characterized by the absence of negation: ‘no’ does not exist.  So a statement, 
which appears in its negative form, might actually imply its opposite. Therefore any 
statement articulates both ‘it is’ and ‘it is not’.  Chronological time is absent from the 
unconscious so timelessness characterizes the unconscious, which makes different 
times coexist in one dream or poem.  The Unconscious is not accessible to 
consciousness, which makes the unconscious only accessible through its derivatives 
like the absence of negation, timelessness visual-images or thing-presentations or 
signifiers, symbolism, metaphor and metonymy. 
 
  
The main difference between a symbol and metaphor is that a symbol conceals 
because it is divorced from its natural context whilst a metaphor reveals because its 
context is overt.  Symbols imply that an unacceptable thought or feeling is concealed 
whereas metaphor communicates because it shows in word-images or metaphor that 
something is like something else.  The Poet articulates this likeness as, expiring love 
is like old-age which is compared to the Autumn leaves, “.. or none, or few do hang / 
Upon those boughs which shake against the cold,” (73.2-3). Conversely, a symbol 
comprises all those rules of the dream-work that disguise unacceptable or traumatic 
unconscious ideas as above.  As soon as one piece of behavior is seen to have at 
least two meanings one of which is standing for the other both concealing and 
expressing it, the relationship is described as symbolic.  This is viewed in the 
symbolic relationship between passion and enervation or being used-up in the line, 
“Consum’d with that which it is nourish’d by.” (73.12). The poetic line symbolically  
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represents love as fire or passion which on the one hand sustains “nourishes” but 
conversely burns itself out, “consum’d”.  In the dream there is a mise-en-scene or an 
attempt at realization akin to hallucination of what cannot be allowed to happen in 
reality.  Freud felt that dreams provided convincing evidence of psychic life more so 
than conscious activity, which is unreliable because of the process of rationalization.  
Sonnet 43 is analyzed to illustrate the combination of metaphor, metonymy and 
symbolism in the representation and interpretation of a dream.  
 
 
The manifest representation of Sonnet 43xii is a mise-en- scene or thoughts in action 
of what cannot be allowed to happen in reality.  The manifest level of the poem 
therefore is an attempt at realization akin to hallucination of the Poet’s wish to see 
the absent loved-object.  Sonnet 43 can equally be thought about as a metaphorical 
description of the contradictory processes found in a dream and as a symbol it both 
disguises and expresses unacceptable ideas about the loved-object.  Ironically the 
loved-object in the dream rather than being presented visually as a shadow or ghost 
of the Loved-object is revealed as the authentic and tangible object.  This is because 
dreams are a  
 
“particular form of thinking in which we appear not to think but to experience, 
that is to say, we attach complete belief to the hallucinations.” (1900. S.E. 4. 
50). 
 
Moreover in Sonnet 43 the Loved-object is not represented as perfect but 
conversely presented figuratively as a flawed object in its “imperfect shade” 
(43.11).   
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Conventionally people think of being aware and conscious as properties of the 
daylight hours whereas mindless oblivion and unawareness belong to the night’s 
sleep.  In Sonnet 43, the Poet turns this orthodoxy on its head and shows how the 
dream reveals a truth which daylight hours obscures.  The Poet effects this within 
the line through rhetorical strategies such as oxymoron, chiasmus, epizeuxis and 
antistasis and by contrasting poetic-images between lines, and between stanza 
and the couplet.  This is made apparent in the reversal of meaning in the second 
phrase to the first phrase in the same line in the chiasmus, “When most I wink, 
then do mine eyes best see,” (43.1).  This inversion immediately reverses the 
connotation of the poem from “sightless” (43.12) to its antonym perceptive.  The 
verb “wink” (43.1) designates close as in sleep or “wink” the eye to wrong doing, 
but “wink” here also signifies the opposite implying that the closed eye in the 
dream is paradoxically open to wrong-doing. This reversal to the opposite 
questions conventional thought but opens the eye or the mind to a truth.  Booth 
(1997.2003)xiii quotes Tilley’s proverbial phrase W501, “Although I wink, I am not 
blind.”  The question asked of this sonnet is what is this vision that the Poet is 
inadvertently blinding himself to in daylight hours that he becomes aware of at 
night or “mine eyes best see” in the dream of Sonnet 43.  In The Metapsychology 
of Dreams Freud writes, “A dream is a projection: an externalization of an internal 
process.” (1915. p.f.l. 11. 231).  This implies what is internal thought or ideas are 
externalized.  This clarifies the line, “For all the day they view things unrespected,” 
(43.2) making it contradict its own premise for it is exactly those “things” (43.2) 
that go unnoticed or repressed “unrespected” during the day that are experienced 
in “clearer light” (43.7) in the dream.  
 
 
The Poet’s use of a chiasmus in line 4 relates the two opposing clauses to one 
another by reversing the order of the words.  Hence, “And darkly bright,” in the first 
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clause although opposite is connected to the second clause “bright in dark directed.”  
This reversal overturns the meaning of the first phrase “And darkly bright,” to its 
opposite in the second phrase, “are bright in dark directed.” (43.4).  This turnaround 
of the word order is emphasized by the oxymoron in the same line “darkly bright”.  
This makes the reading of the line, although I look on thee during the day your image 
is only “darkly bright” or has a sinister “darkly” opaque quality.  Moreover even 
though it is visible it goes “unrespected” or un-noticed but at night the reverse occurs 
and the image becomes “Bright” (43.4.) or clear.  Alternatively this line is a literal 
translation of the Renaissance view that eyes emit light.  What is most apparent in 
the first four lines of this poem are the contradictions and the opposites which exist 
side by side as if the Poet in this sonnet had entered into the workings of the primary 
process in the unconscious where words exist with their antithesis still intact, (Freud, 
S. S.E. X1. 153-163)xiv    
 
 
The Poet makes use of the rhetorical figure epizeuxis or the repetition of a word in 
sharp succession. This repetition emphasizes the paradox where the dream world 
rather than being incomprehensible, elucidates, “shadow shadows doth make bright” 
(43.5).  This overturns the meaning of shadows into that of embodiment.  In this 
sonnet, all conventional-thought is inverted and the “shadow” (43.5 and 6) itself 
denotes the embodied clarity of the image, whilst the embodied image becomes 
obscure and opaque and like a “shadow” during the day.   Moreover this highlights 
the sense of the illogicality of the actual representation of a shadow being able to 
cast its own shadow which in turn is capable of transforming into an embodied image 
that “ doth make bright”.  In this way, a truth is revealed at night, which is obscured 
during the day.  The “shadow’ or negative side of the loved-object, is revealed at 
night but during the day it is opaque or in “shadow”.  This transformation of illusion 
into what feels like reality is comprehensible because in the dream world, “reality-
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testing is abandoned” and the dream-world accounts as, “undisputed reality” (Freud. 
1915. p.f.l. 11.242)xv.   It is the irony that this upside-down world of the dream creates 
true insight into the self and others through the alliterative oxymoron “thy shade 
shines so” (43.8) or your image, which during the day was impervious, or in “shadow”  
becomes transparent at night, “shines so”.  Furthermore the use of “shadow” 
normally refers to the dark or sinister part of the person’s character, which becomes 
highlighted in the silent “sh” of the night.   
 
Duncan-Jones (1997.196)xvi draws the readers attention to the words in parenthesis 
in the line, “How would (I say) mine eyes be blessed made,“ (43.9).  This is apt as 
dreams are idiosyncratic and for the Poet they are experienced as healing “blessed” 
because without dreams there is no space to process those images and ideas which 
go “unrespected” during the day but at night reveal the “darkly” or more sinister side 
of the Loved-object, “thy fair imperfect shade” which during the day is repressed 
because it would cause anxiety and is therefore censored.  Freud in his lecture 
Repression (1915. p.f.l.11.147)xvii writes, “the essence of repression lies simply in 
turning something away, and keeping it at a distance from conscious.”  The 
juxtaposition of opposites of “fair” (43.11) and “imperfect shade" heightens the sense 
of imperfect where light or fair-minded in “fair” is set against dark or sinister.  This 
reverses the literal sense of “imperfect” to a figurative representation and turns the 
normative sense of rational thought being the property of daylight hours on its head.  
It makes of the dream-world truth and day-light hours false.  The reversal to the 
opposite in the chiasmus in the couplet draws together all the senses of this sonnet 
and turns night into what we normally conceive of as days, “All days are nights” 
(43.13).  The phrase that follows on “to see till I see thee” (43.13) makes of the 
ordinary experience of external perception into something that is cloudy or uncertain, 
whilst night transform the same thoughts and ideas into “bright” insight, “And night 
bright days, when dreams do show thee me.” (43.14).   
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Reading both the manifest and latent sides of Sonnet 43 creates a sense of an 
upside-down world where night illuminates what the day obscures.  If only the 
manifest reading of the sonnet had been interpreted, the Sonnet would have been 
glossed as a smooth coherent narrative of the Poet’s longing to see the absent-
Loved-object, which is rewarded by having a beautiful dream about the loved object.  
The dream would have been glossed as merely filling in the gap of the absence of 
the Loved-object.  The interpretation of both the manifest and latent content of the 
dream reveals a truth about the Poet’s contradictory feelings about the Loved-object, 
which are actualized in the mise-en-scene of the dream-world.  
 
 
According to David Lodge (1977.79-81) xviii , Roman Jakobson (1956) shows that 
Metonymy and metaphor may be the characterizing structures of two poetic types, 
that is, poetry of association by contiguity of movement within a single world of 
discourse and the poetry of association by contrast, which joins a plurality of worlds.  
Selection involves the perception of similarity of the same sets and it implies the 
possibility of substitution within the same set or category.  This occurs when nouns 
such as ships, crafts, vessels or boats or verbs such as crossed ploughed, sailed or 
moved are substituted one for the other.  Metonymy is closely associated with 
synecdoche or substitution of part for whole in the former and substitution of whole 
for part in the latter.  Examples of the former are the use of the ‘White house’ to imply 
the whole American Government whereas ‘the library[rather than one person in the 
library] is very helpful’ represents the whole library for a part or one helpful person in 
it.  
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Metaphor and metonymy are opposed because they are generated by different 
principles.  For instance metaphor is placed on the selection axis whereas metonymy 
combines words through contiguous association into a linguistic structure so that 
perceptions or events that occur together are associated together.  The development 
of discourse may take place along two different semantic lines: one topic may lead to 
another either through their similarity or their contiguity.  The metaphorical way would 
be appropriate for the selection axis whereas the metonymic way would be apt for 
contiguity.  In normal verbal behavior both are used but careful observation reveals 
that under the influence of a cultural pattern, personality and verbal style preference 
is given to one of the two processes over the other (1977.79).  For instance drama is 
basically metaphoric as is portrayed in Shakespeare’s play King Lear (1605-1606) 
where there is no linear progression in the play but the characters manage 
similarities and contrasts between the weather and human life and between 
appearance and realities.  Film on the other hand is metonymic and the technique of 
close-up is synecdoche as it substitutes a facial expression for the whole person.  
Laplanche and Pontalis in their article on displacement (1988.123)xix note that the 
linguist Roman Jakobson felt justified in correlating,  
 
“the unconscious mechanisms described by Freud and the rhetorical 
procedures of metaphor and metonymy which he holds to be the fundamental 
poles of language; he thus brings together displacement with metonymy in 
which association is based on contiguity, while he sees symbolism as 
corresponding to the metaphoric dimension which is governed by the law of 
association by similarity. Jacques Lacan (1957) has taken up these 
suggestions and developed them assimilating displacement to metonymy and 
condensation to metaphor; for Lacan human desire is structured fundamentally 
by the laws of the unconscious and its nature is metonymic par excellence.”  
 
 
According to Empson (2004.192-193)xx when two meanings of a word are opposite it 
reveals a fundamental division in the writer’s mind.  In this instance it could be a 
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compromise that is the outcome of a split between the conscious and unconscious 
as in Sonnet 43 or a vertical split where one part of the mind takes account of 
conventional thinking, whilst the other is turned toward desire.  Both types of 
dissociation are represented in the first seventeen Shakespearean Sonnets.  
 
 
The theoretical assumptions outlined in this chapter underpin the whole thesis.  Art is 
a symbol of life but it is not life as it is lived.  Through an unconscious symbol like 
Freud’s dream-theory there is a desire to communicate something but an aversion to 
doing so overtly because the Super-ego or moral conscience of the individual 
responds to it as inappropriate unacceptable or amoral.  To evade the Censor, the 
communication therefore becomes distorted disguised broken up and scattered in all 
ways that are familiar to the Interpretation of dreams.  The symbol therefore conceals 
because it is divorced from its context. It could be said of Shakespeare’s play 
Macbeth (1606 and 1616) that it symbolically represents sterility and barrenness 
whilst on the other hand the metaphor in the excerpt from Macbeth like, “thick” (49), 
“pall” (50) “peep” “blanket” (52) 
“Come thick night, 
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell, 
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes, 
Nor heaven peep, through the blanket of the dark 
To cry ‘Hold, hold!” (Act 1. Sc.4. 49-53)xxi 
 
are used to compare clandestine desire to a funeral casket and night to a opaque 
covering that like a blanket covers and conceals hidden desire which prevents 
heaven or morality secretly looking in “peep” and preventing the malevolence in 
Macbeth’s desire from becoming actualized, ‘Hold, hold.”  Metaphor therefore reveals 
because the contexts and comparisons are plain to see.   
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The Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets through metaphor, metonymy, representation 
and secondary revision elaborates both sides of the communication the manifest or 
normative view of it ‘should be’ and that which is concealed or which would offend 
the moral conscience of the individual if the denial ‘it is not’ were made conscious.  
The Poet’s equivocal poetry in this way assumes a three-dimensional rather than a 
two-dimensional form.  If only the manifest account or idealized ‘should be’ was 
presented the poetry would represent a flat harmonious smooth text, which would 
represent an idealized romanticized view of the world.  The Poet in Sonnet 8 
presents this flawless harmony as, 
“Mark how one string sweet husband to another, 
strikes each in each by mutual ordering; 
Resembling sire, and child, and happy mother, 
Who all in one, one pleasing note do sing” (8. 9-12)  
 
Yet even this pleasing combination of sounds is punctured by the separate and 
singled-out discordant note of the Loved-object’s obdurate refusal to preserve his 
beauty for posterity, “Sings this to thee thou single wilt prove none” (8.14).  The 
poem therefore decodes as ‘this is harmony’ and ‘this is not harmony or ‘this is 
dissonance’. 
As a three-dimensional symbol the Poet’s poetry presents a paradox, of ‘it is’ and ‘it 
is not’ which is similar to the cognitive dissonance set up in determining ‘this is an 
elongated disc’ and ‘this is a skull’ found in Hans Holbein the younger’s painting of 
The Ambassadors.  The visual equivocation described above analogically simulates 
the intellectual experience of paradox which is found in the figurative representations 
of the Poet’s poetry and mirrors the everyday experience of conflict, ambivalence or 
of being in two minds simultaneously.   
 
 
Freud saw the translation and interpretation of the unconscious visual thing 
presentations into word presentations as making what is unconscious, conscious.  
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This is demonstrated in the creation of metaphor.  Here, the nameless known in the 
unconscious is translated into some thing that is comparable to the named known in 
consciousness.  In the Assessment of the Unconscious (1915.11.207) Freud writes, 
 
“We now seem to know all at once what the difference is between a conscious 
and an unconscious presentation. The conscious presentation comprises the 
presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while 
the unconscious presentation is the presentation of thing alone. (1915.11.207). 
 
Metaphor and metonymy are products of the word and therefore of culture and of 
consciousness and what was a disguised symbolic or thing presentation or what 
Bollas termed the unthought known (1987. 277) in the unconscious when translated 
into metaphor and metonymy, becomes conscious as the work of the named known. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
The Fear of Mortality in four of Shakespeare’s Sonnets. 
 
 
 
 
Richard 
“Give me that glass, and therein will I read. 
No deeper wrinkles yet? Hath sorrow struck 
So many blows upon this face of mine 
And made no deeper wounds? O flatt’ring glass, 
Thou dost beguile me!” (Richard 11. Act 5. Sc1. 266-269) 
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This chapter ascribes meaning to the contradiction of opposites in some of 
Shakespeare’s first seventeen sonnets through the Freudian theoretical perspective 
of Narcissism and the Life and Death Instinct.  In Sonnets 1, 2, 4 and 10 the Poet of 
Shakespeare’s sonnets appear to express two contradictory views.  One view impels 
the object to preserve his beauty for posterity whilst on the other hand the object 
rebels against this injunction and takes the view that his sexuality is part of him and it 
his choice of how to use it.  In these sonnets the Poet presents an emotionally 
conflicted view of life as it is lived as opposed to a moral idealized view of life and 
how it should be lived. 
 
 
In Sonnets 1 and 10 the Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets presents two emotionally 
conflicted attitudes towards the Fair Youth.  The attitude is epitomized in the 
oxymoron “tender churl” (1.12).  On the one hand the Fair Youth is idealized as 
“tender” or sensitive and on the other hand denigrated as an ill-mannered boor or 
“churl.”  Notwithstanding the core meaning of the poem lies in the irony of the lines, 
“Thyself thy foe, to thy sweet self too cruel:” (1.8) and in the lines, “Grant if thou wilt, 
thou art beloved of many, / But that thou none lov’st is most evident:” (10. 3-4) and 
finally in, “Pity the world, or else this glutton be, / To eat the world’s due, by the grave 
and thee.” (1.13-14).  Sonnet 1, 2, 4 and 10 are interpreted according to Freud’s 
theory On Narcissism: An Introduction (1914. p.f.l. 11. 59-99)
xxiii
xxii and the Freudian 
theory of The Life and Death Instincts in his lecture, Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920. p.f.l. 11. 269-339).   The pathos of Narcissism is that in the excess of self-
love, the subject rather than preserving the self destroys it.  Ironically on the other 
hand the wish for immortality through altruism or the concern for the well-being 
of others in the line, “From fairest creatures we desire increase” (1.1) is equally self-
defeating because it too is a self-seeking deathless, “never die” (1.2) “desire”(1.1) 
and not grounded in reality. 
 25 
 
 
In this chapter the theoretical concept of Narcissism (1914. p.f.l. 11. 59-99)
xxvii
xxiv is 
broken down into those aspects, which relate specifically to aspects of Sonnet 1, 2, 4 
and Sonnet 10 and more generally to the first seventeen sonnets.  The movement 
from narcissism to object-relationship is described as a move between ego-libido or 
self-interest to object-libido (1914. p.f.l. 11.78) or belief in acting for the good of 
others. The more love there is for the self the less love there is for the other.  The 
Narcissists chooses a love object on the model of his own self or ideal-ego whereas 
the humanitarian choses an object on the model of the other or ego-ideal (1914. 
p.f.l.11. 90).  The poetry draws a contradiction between the life-giving properties of 
procreation, which ‘wishfully’ lead to immortality as opposed to the vanity, self-
preservation and futility of self-love, which leads to mortality.  This contradiction 
between mortality and immortality is understood through the Freudian concept of the 
Life and Death instinct (1920. p.f.l. 11. 306-315).xxv  The mind-set of the Narcissist is 
founded in phantasy and as such is analogous to that of the dreamer and processed 
by the primary processes of the dream-work of condensation and displacement, 
which Jakobsonxxvi views as in accord with the linguistic process of metaphor and 
metonymy.  The Poet’s use of metaphor and metonymy rather than the abstract 
concepts of narcissism or humanitarianism in Sonnets 2 and 4 break down the 
concept of self-interest into its derivatives like agriculture, old-age and the economy 
which makes it possible for the reader-auditor to relate to and identify with rather 
than if the Poet had made use of didactic abstract concepts like egoism which would 
have been disregarded as the received axiomatic view and possibly ignored or 
repressed.  The Poet’s conflicted view of the love-object is examined according to 
Empson’s   understanding of ambiguity which Empson views as the outcome of a 
“fundamental division in the writer’s mind” (2004.192).  This is consistent with the 
fundamental Freudian concept of opposites or the divided self, which appears split 
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when the mind is conflicted between the emotions of love and hate, idealization and 
denigration and life and death.  The discussion concludes with the Poet’s move from 
the embodiment of beauty in concrete objects to one of symbolic immortality in the 
figurative beauty of the Poet’s poetry about the Love-object.  
 
 
Paul Nacke 1899 introduced the term Narcissism to denote the attitude of a person 
who loves his own body in the same way that the body of an external sexual object is 
loved.  The Narcissist obstructs the influence of external reality and by so doing 
thwarts the opinions of others in the external world which results in the megalomania 
of narcissism found in sleep, melancholia, mourning and all forms of desire where 
the influence of the unconscious predominates over the preconscious-conscious and 
reality testing.  In the thrall of his own self as ideal the Narcissist rejects the voice of 
the Ego Ideal, which develops into the Super-Ego or moral conscience (1914.p.f.l.11. 
89).  Freud writes, 
 
“For what prompted the subject to form an ego ideal, on whose behalf his 
conscience acts as watchman, arose from the critical influence of his parents 
(conveyed to him by the medium of the voice), to whom were added, as time 
went on those who trained him and taught him.” (1914.p.f.l. 11. 90). 
 
 Like all products of the Unconscious, the immature ideal-ego (1914) is imaginary 
and renders the same superficial reading of the self as given by a mirror as in 
Richard 11 above.  The Poet describes this egoism as, “But thou contracted to thine 
own bright eyes,” (1.5).  The hedonism of the ideal ego is based on fantasy; this 
renders it self-destructive and dangerous to the self and to society. The Poet 
articulates this pleasure-seeking state of mind as, “ Thyself thy foe to thy sweet self 
too cruel:” (1.8). 
 
  
 27 
Freud, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) describes the irony inherent in the 
pleasure principle.  If the pleasure principle or hedonism in the Unconscious played a 
dominant role in life the majority of our mental processes would be accompanied by 
pleasure.  The reality is they are not.  The un-pleasure of the reality principle is 
patent when the efflorescence of youth comes to an end and when the idealized 
experiences of the narcissism of childhood are brought to a painful and distressing 
conclusion and the Ego experiences humiliation when he can no longer expect that 
“..he shall once more really be the centre and core of creation – ‘His Majesty the 
baby’ “ (1914.p.f.l.11.85).  Central to Freud’s notion of Narcissism is his concept of 
object-choice (1914).  Whereas the anaclitic person (1914.84) allows himself 
dependency on others the narcissistic person chooses an object on the model of his 
own self; that is, what he himself is; what he himself was; would like to be and 
someone who was once part of himself (1914).  The Poet articulates this egoism as, 
“contracted to thine own bright eyes,” (1.5) and, “Thou art thy mother’s glass and she 
in thee / Calls back the lovely April of her prime,” (3.9-10).  This choice which 
articulates the self as the ideal ego of narcissism rather than like the Ego-Ideal who 
aspires to procreate for the benefit of others.  This renders the Narcissist’s 
orientation to the external world, paranoiac.  From Melanie’s Klein’s (1946. 9-10)xxviii 
perspective this is because, “With an unassimilated idealized object there goes a 
feeling that the ego has no life of its own.”   The Poet expresses this as,  “But that 
thou none lov’st is most evident:” (10.4) and again, “No love toward others in that 
bosom sits, / That on himself such murd’rous sham.e commits.” (9.13-14).  
 
 
Central to the see-saw movement of ego-libido and object-libido is the Ego’s attitude 
to procreation which from the narcissistic perspective is expressed as Sexual 
intercourse is his prerogative and his choice of how to use it; as opposed to an 
attitude where the subject views himself as temporary holder of a birthright which is 
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passed on to succeeding generations.  The Poet in Sonnet 4 expresses a similar 
view of the Loved-object’s attitude to procreation, “Unthrifty loveliness why dost thou 
spend, / Upon thy self thy beauty’s legacy?” (4.1-2).  On the other hand,  Sonnet 1 
opens with the wish that, “From fairest creatures we desire increase,” and continues 
with a plea for immortality, “never die.”  “The essence of life” writes Freud is directed 
to the coalescence of two different cell-bodies.  That alone is what guarantees the 
immortality of the living substance in the higher organisms”(1920.p.f.l. 11.329). 
 
If two different animalculae, at the moment before show signs of senescence 
are able to conjugate (soon after which they once more separate) they are 
saved from growing old and become rejuvenated.  Conjugation is the 
forerunner of the sexual production of higher creatures and is limited to the 
mixture of substances of two individuals” (1920.p.f. l. 11. 320). 
 
Conversely narcissism is seen to be part of the death –instinct (1920.316) whilst life 
and immortality are considered part of Eros or fusion with others or sexuality 
between two different objects (1920. p.f.l. 11. 311-313).  A similar contradiction is 
enunciated by the Poet, “Thy unus’d beauty must be tomb’d with thee, / Which used 
lives th’executor to be.” (4.13-14).   Freud quotes Weismann (1882) who introduced 
the division of living substance into mortal and immortal parts or what Freud would 
have termed ego-instincts and sexual instincts.  The mortal part is the body in the 
narrow sense.  This soma alone is subject to natural death whilst the germ-cells are 
concerned with sex and inheritance. This is the immortal portion, which is concerned 
with the survival of the species and reproduction. 
 
“ The individual does actually carry on a twofold existence: one to serve his 
own purposes and the other as a link in a chain, which he serves against his 
will, or at least involuntary. The individual regards sexuality as one of his ends; 
whereas from another point of view he is an appendage to his germ-plasm, at 
whose disposal he puts his energies in return for a bonus of pleasure” (1914. 
p.f.l. 11. 70-71). 
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In Beyond the Pleasure principle (1920. p.f.l. 11. 316) Freud notes that it is only on 
this condition of uniting with another cell that the sexual function can prolong the life 
of a cell and lend it the appearance of immortality.  Whereas Freud assigns 
narcissism to the death instinct because it unties connections between people or in 
the Poet’s words, “For having traffic with thy self alone,” (4.9) Freud assigns sexuality 
to Eros or the life instinct which was viewed by Freud as principally a force of 
cohesion which it effects through establishing ever greater unities which preserve life 
by binding and combining more and more different living substance into ever-greater 
unities.  Again in the Poet’s words, “Which used lives th’executor to be.” (4.14). 
 
 
The state of mind of the Narcissist is akin to that of the dreamer.  Freud writes in 
Metapsychology of Dreams (1915. p.f.l. 11.230) that, ‘narcissism may be described 
as the libidinal complement of egoism” and in the Interpretation of Dreams, “The 
beloved ego appears in all dreams.  The dreamer’s ego is invariably present in 
person or through identification” (S.E. IV. 223).  The manifest dream according to 
Freud  “Is a (disguised) fulfillment of a (repressed) wish.” (S.E. IV 160.)xxix .  This 
distortion is necessary for if the manifest dream became conscious the dreamer 
would awake in fright for “Dreams are the fulfillment of wishes” (S. E. XX11. 18)xxx 
and these unconscious wishes are not compatible with reality.  The dream makes 
use of condensation and displacement to formulate the manifest dream so that it 
evades the censor. Likewise the Poet makes use of metaphor and metonymy in 
order to reconceive egoism in a form more acceptable to consciousness.  In the 
creation of the manifest dream unusable abstract rational thought is,  
 
“transformed into images mainly of a visual sort; that is to say, word 
presentations are taken back to the thing presentations which correspond to 
them .. it is always ready to exchange one word for another till it finds the 
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expression which is most handy for plastic representation” (1915.p.f.l.11.235-
236)xxxi. 
 
 
And again in Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconsciousxxxii displacement as part of 
the dream-work makes possible, 
 
“The selection of ideas which are sufficiently remote from the objectionable one 
for the censorship to allow them to pass, but which are nevertheless derivatives 
of that idea and have taken over its psychical cathexis by means of a complete 
transference. For this reason displacement are never absent in a dream..” (S.E.  
V111.171)xxxiii. 
 
 
In this way the psychoanalytic signifier or the manifest wish in the dream or poem is 
disguised to allow the sleeper in the dream to go on sleeping and the Narcissist to 
remain blind or ignorant and unaware of his own self-absorption and conceit.  Roman 
Jakobson associates the rhetorical strategies of metaphor and metonymy with the 
unconscious processes of condensation and displacement.  In the poetry of 
Shakespeare’s first seventeen sonnets the egoism and narcissism of the Fair Youth 
is metaphorically and metonymically displaced from the overt threatening idea of 
egoism, selfishness, self-centeredness and self-absorption to ideas that are 
acceptable to consciousness or in the Poet’s words narcissism can be thought of as, 
“Feed’st thy light’s flame with self-substantial fuel, / Making a famine where 
abundance lies,” (1.6-7).  In this way the threatening idea of narcissism by losing its 
original form loses its power to attract attention to itself and is allowed to cross over 
the barrier into consciousness.   
 
 
In this fashion the narcissism of youth is broken down into aspects or derivatives of 
narcissistic attitude as revealed in the poetry of Shakespeare’s sonnets and 
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displaced on to themes of the “grave” (1. 14), eating (1.14), tomb (3.7; 4.13; 17.3), 
distilling (5.9; 6.2), seasons (12, 2, 18, 5), thrift and unthrift (9, 2,4,13), audit ( 6, 2), 
self-will and self-killed (1, 6), egoism which leads the world impoverished (1, 19, 
15,16, 18, 17), printing and verse (11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19), time ( 12, 15, 16, 19, 5, 18), 
house and descent (3, 10) and the rising and setting of the sun in Sonnet 7.    The 
metaphors in Sonnet 1-17 employ a diversity of vehicles, which are displaced onto: 
flowers like the “Rose”  (1.2), which become distilled and therefore retain their 
perfume. This occurs in Sonnet (5.13-14) and Sonnet (6.1-4) while vegetal conceits 
occur in in Sonnet (3.9-10), (5.5-10), (6.1-2), (12.2-12) and (15. 5-8).  The young 
man’s self-destructive prodigal and egotistical behavior is associated with the 
personification of Time’s mutilation in Sonnet (1.2-4) and Sonnet 19 “Devouring time” 
(19.1). The contrast of opposites is pertinent in the young man himself who is 
described both as “beauty’s Rose” (1.2) “the world’s fresh ornament” (1.9) as well as 
“niggarding” (1.12) and again in the oxymoron of “tender churl”. (1.12). 
 
 
William Empson in his discussion of the seventh type of ambiguity comments on the 
Freudian concept of condensation and Freud’s fundamental concept of opposites in 
his theory of dreams,   
 
“Now a Freudian opposite at least marks dissatisfaction; the notion of what you 
want involves the idea that you have not got it, and this again involves the 
‘opposite defined by your context,’ which is what you cannot avoid” (2004.193). 
 
Empson connects his notion to the condensation found in dreams or metaphor in 
poetry because these two processes combine two different ideas or images into a 
novel composite unity.  Likewise the processes in the creation of the dream are 
similar to that of metaphor.  The two different psychical states of mind like reality and 
the unconscious combine to form an innovative compromise as a replacement 
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satisfaction in the shape of the manifest dream or poem.  What Empson appears to 
be implying is that there are two types of splits or disjunctions in the mind.  Both are 
the outcome of a defensive conflict between the pleasure principle or phantasy and 
the reality principle of the Ego instincts.  Freud introduced the horizontal split in his 
Theory of Dreams (1900a) and in psychic health communication between the Ucs. 
and Pcs. occurs and this osmosis-like diffusion between the  two systems occurs 
through derivatives of the unconscious, which are able to evade the censor.  These 
derivatives are here illustrated by metaphor and metonymy of Shakespeare’s 
sonnets 1-17 as above.   
 
 
On the other hand Freud also conceptualized the defensive process of splitting of the 
ego as a vertical split in the mind and this notion was introduced by Freud in his 
article Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence” (S.E. XX111. 275-278)xxxiv.    
The vertical split describes the coexistence at the heart of the ego of two psychical 
attitudes towards reality.  The first attitude takes reality into account whilst the 
second disavows it and replaces it by a product of desire.  The two attitudes persist 
side by side without influencing one another.  As this contradiction between two 
different realities touches on four of the first seventeen sonnets of Shakespeare’s 
sonnets, it could be said, that the Fair Youth views sexuality as one of his own needs 
and “He is the mortal vehicle of a (possibly) immortal substance” (1920 &1914).  The 
separation of the sexual instincts in the form of immortality from the opposing ego-
instincts in the form of mortality would simply reflect this twofold function of the 
individual” (1914. p.f.l. 11. 71 and 1920. Vol. p.f.l. 11. 318).  This split in the Ego 
presents two opposites not as contradictions of one another where one view is 
cancelled out but the two views co-exist together without influencing the other.  The 
Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets expresses a similar sentiment in the form of a 
chiasmus, “To give away your self, keeps your self still,” (16.13).   
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The horizontal split by contrast occurs in dreams and all forms of phantasy and 
desire.  Here a compromise is formed between the reality-orientated Pcs. and the 
phantasy orientated Ucs.  The outcome of this compromise is that the pre-conscious 
wish is formed, which “gives expression to the unconscious impulse in the material of 
the preconscious day’s residues” (1915. p.f.l. 11.234).  For Freud, “Dreams are a 
form of thinking” (S.E . V111. 145)xxxv and again in the Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis (S.E. XXV. 136), 
 
 “A dream is a compromise formation between the wish to sleep and on the 
other hand it allows a repressed instinctual impulse to obtain the satisfaction 
that is possible in these circumstances, in the form of the hallucinated 
fulfillment of a wish.” 
  
Freud regards Considerations of Representabilityxxxvi as the third important factor of 
the dream work. Considerations of Representability relieves the psychological 
pressure of constricted thinking by pouring the content of a thought into another 
mould; that is pictures.  The unconscious wish occurs in the manifest dream or by 
extension any verbal product from phantasies to literary work that exists in the form 
of metaphor and metonymy and where the intention is that the unconscious signifier 
will be interpreted.  If it is poetry it is not subjected to the scrutiny of reality testing.  In 
Two Principles of Mental Functioning (1911. p.f.l. 11. 41-42) Freud writes that Art can,  
 
“bring about reconciliation between the two principles” [of pleasure and reality] 
“in a peculiar way.  An artist is originally a man who turns away from reality 
because he cannot come to terms with the renunciation of instinctual 
satisfaction which it at first demands, and who allows his erotic and ambitious 
wishes full play in the life of phantasy.  He finds the way back to reality, 
however, from this world of phantasy by making use of special gifts to mould 
his phantasies into truths of a new kind, which are valued by men as precious 
reflections of reality.”  
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Likewise the Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets symbolically substitutes (S.E., 
XX.145) xxxvii  his wish for the concrete immortality of beauty in the Fair Youth in 
embodied form through progeny to a more realistic desire for the immortality of 
beauty to be found in symbolic form in the Poet’s poetry about the beauty of the Fair 
Youth, “Thou shouldst print more, not let that copy die” (11.14) and “As he takes from 
you, I engraft you new.” (15.14) and “You should live twice in it, and in my rhyme” 
(17.14). 
 
 
The discussion above concentrates on narcissism in those aspects, which relate 
specifically to Sonnets, 1, 2, 4 and 10 and more generally to sonnets 1-17.  In Sonnet 
1 the Poet foregrounds the conflict between immortality, which results from a moral 
idealized view of life as opposed to mortality, which is a portrait of life and the way it 
is lived.  Ironically both life-styles lead to death.  This is because the aspiration for 
corporeal immortality is found to be unrealistic and therefore unattainable.  Similarly 
the narcissism of the Fair Youth’s desire to preserve the self at the expense of the 
other or progeny in the poetry is found to lead to death.  
 
Quatrain 1 of Sonnet 1 lays out the conflicted main theme of this poem, which is the 
contradiction between desire and reality; immortality and mortality.  Sonnet 1 opens 
with the sense of all-inclusive created things encapsulated in the word, “creatures” 
(1.1) which includes, man, animal vegetable, all of which are perceived as “fairest” 
(1.1).  The idealization of the all-embracing sense of all living creatures is 
immediately contracted to include only those that are “fairest” or most beautiful or 
fair-minded which introduces an aberrant note of eugenics into the sense of 
immortality.  The conflict between immortality and mortality is introduced by the two 
senses of “by”.   One sense of ‘by’ is used in “thereby” (1.2) while the second “by” 
occurs in “should by time decease,” (1.3).  This doubling of “by” according to Booth 
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(1977.135) creates an ambiguity in the sense of “beauty’s Rose” which can be 
glossed either as mortality in the transience of “the bloom of youth” or as, “one flower 
which blooms and dies” or alternatively as immortality in a “rose bush which goes on 
generating flowers indefinitely”.  The first two lines therefore echo the swing from 
ego-libido to object-libido; between narcissism to a relationship to objects.  The 
question becomes is the rose “the fragile vehicle of beauty (Colin Burrow 
(2002.383)xxxviii  or is it part of a line of descendants as in “rose bush” or a Tudor 
emblem of the Tudor dynasty (Duncan-Jones. 1977.112).  The conjunction “But” 
(1.3) introduces a paradox into the poem through the sense of “never die’ (1.2) to 
except in the circumstances of the riper dying, “But as the riper should by time 
decease,” (1.3).  This line contradicts line 2, where the “Rose” (1.2) is impelled to 
“never die.”  Line four of Sonnet 1 actualizes the idealized-illusory sense of “never 
die,” into it practical and tangible outcome in “His tender heir might bear his memory:” 
(1.4).  The Poet’s use of “tender” draws the two sense of “tender”  together in the 
supple stem of the plant, as well as “tender” in the sensitive heir of descent. The pun 
or homophone on “bear” (1.4) reveals the condensation between fruit and heir, which 
translates into bear a child or the bearing of fruit.   
 
 
Whereas the first quatrain lays down the theme of immortality and the preservation of 
only “fairest creatures” (1.1) of the species, 
 
“In considering narcissism from the libidinal aspect one can see that the 
overvaluation of the self plays a central role, based mainly on the idealization of 
the self.  Self-idealization is maintained by omnipotent introjective and 
projective identification with good objects and their qualities.  In this way the 
narcissist feels that everything that is valuable relating to external objects and 
the outside world is part of him or is omnipotently controlled by him, (Rosenfeld, 
1971.173).xxxix    
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By contrast in the second quatrain the tone of voice adopted by the Poet changes 
sharply from idealized self-satisfaction if not complacency to one of denigration 
censure and shaming.  This quatrain illustrates the destructive aspects of narcissism, 
which describe an internal state of the Ego’s destructiveness towards and within the 
self and indifference to posterity, 
 
“we find that the destructive aspects of self-idealization again play a central role, 
but now it is the idealization of the omnipotent destructive parts of the self.  
They are directed both against any positive libidinal object-relationship and any 
libidinal part of the self which experiences need for an object and the desire to 
depend on it (Rosenfeld, 1971.173).xl  
 
 
This insensibility towards others is represented as egoism, “contracted to thine 
own bright eyes” (1.5) as well as the Fair Youth’s independence of others, 
“Feed’st thy light’s flame” (1.6), and “self-substantial fuel” (1.6).  According to 
Booth the sense of “self-substantial fuel” suggests a simile with a candle, which 
burns itself out.  This is apt as the energy of narcissism is self-depleting rather 
than energizing as it saps the vitality of the ego, in the same way that a candle 
burns itself out.  According to Freud (1914. p.f.l. 11.94), 
 
“Loving in it itself in so far as it involves longing and deprivation, lowers self-
regard; whereas being loved, having one’s love returned, and possessing the 
loved object, raises it once more.” (1914.94-95). 
 
 
The Poet presents a paradox in the image of “self-substantial fuel”, which leads to 
“famine” (1.7) rather than “abundance” (1.7).  The expectation of the reader is that 
normally abundance will lead to profusion; but in line 5 abundance leads to famine in 
the line, “Making a famine where abundance lies” (1.7). This reversal to the opposite 
serves to mimic the swing from object-libido to ego- libido and intensifies the irony of 
abundance, which diminishes into “famine”.  This translates as the Fair-Youth in his 
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abundance of sperm rather than creating a copious line of descent leaves no 
descendants “making a famine” as he squanders all the sperm in masturbation.  
Burrow appears to empathize with the pathos of narcissism in line 7, “My very 
abundance of contact with what I love makes me poor”. The irony of narcissism is 
that self-love saps the self of vitality because no potency, vigour or object-libido is 
absorbed from the world of others.  This act of self-destruction is epitomized in, 
“Thyself thy foe, to thy sweet self too cruel:” (1.8) because in the Youth’s self-
sufficiency he does not leave an heir and his beauty rather than being immortalized 
dies.   
 
 
This egoism is exemplified in the isolating and shaming sense of “But thou” (1.5).  In 
two short monosyllabic words the loving sense of “tender heir” is transformed into the 
outsider and excluded as other.  Ironically the Fair-Youth appears equally to exclude 
himself by relying only on himself, in “self-substantial fuel” .  The Poet’s use of a pun 
in “contracted” (1.5) makes “contracted” ambiguous.  “Contract” (1.5) implies both a 
marriage contract to another different person in the anaclitic object relationship 
whereas “contracted to thine own bright eyes” diminishes the self to one who is 
“contracted” to the looking glass where the other is not an external other but is the 
loved object of the self as in the quote of Richard 11 above (Richard 11. Act 5. Sc1. 
266-269). 
 
 
Quatrain 3 suggests the generality and universality of the first quatrain as well as the 
harshness of the invective towards the Fair Youth in the second quatrain.  The sense 
of “now” (1.9) implies a sense of the transience of the beauty of the Youth, which was 
first introduced in the metaphor, “beauty’s Rose.” The use of the noun “ornament” 
(1.9) qualifies the adjective “fresh” (1.9).  This creates a contradiction in the sense of 
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beauty.  On the one hand “fresh” suggests novel, unfamiliar and unaffected by time 
whilst on the other the beauty of the Fair-youth is presented as a mere external 
decoration almost a façade like decoration, ”ornament” which like the “Rose” will 
shortly after blooming or reaching its prime, wither and die.  Paradoxically this line 
implies that beauty achieves its perfection as it decays which underwrites the 
meaning of, “But as the riper should by time decease,”(1.3).   
 
 
The Poet’s use of puns and oxymoron pervade quatrain 3 which replicate the Poet’s 
ambivalent attitude to the fair youth.  Burrow views the sense of “only” as chief 
forerunner, which precedes the arrival of spring whereas Duncan-Jones writes that 
“gaudy” (1.10) does not necessarily carry the connotation of vulgarity or excess, but 
the sense of extreme or outstanding.  In this chapter “gaudy” is viewed in its 
ambiguity of both vulgarity in relation to the garishness “gaudy” egotistic Fair Youth 
and conversely outstanding or singular in its relation to “fairest creatures.”  This 
doubling echoes the Poet’s own divided ambivalent attitude towards the Youth 
portrayed in the oxymoron “tender churl.”  The use of the noun “bud” is consistent 
with the sense of “tender heir” which according to Booth connotes an un-opened 
flower or sexually un-opened.  Burrow comments on the pun in the ambiguity of the 
word “content” (1.11).  When the stress falls on the second syllable of “content” 
content signifies emotional disposition, ”content” which evokes the sense of  “self-
substantial” (1.6) whereas when the stress falls on the first syllable of “content” it 
implies the substance out of which the Fair Youth is made or the pleasure in his own 
libido “lights flame” (1.6) which he hoards for himself like a glutton hoards food.  The 
sense of “bud”  (1.11) together with the pejorative sense of “tender churl” 
emphasizes the sense of the Fair youth squandering his manhood on himself like a 
sexually un-opened or un-germinated flower, which dies before becoming “riper”.  
Booth interprets the oxymoron “tender churl” to mean tender miser or tender boor.  
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The oxymoron implies the Poet’s divided opinion of the Fair-Youth, which is both 
protective in “tender” and uncouth in “churl.”  The sense of “tender-churl” contradicts 
“tender heir” which according to Duncan-Jones implies a paradox that the Fair Youth 
squanders his beauty even as he tries to preserve it for himself.  The transformation 
of “tender heir” to “tender churl” calls attention to the antithetical themes of this poem 
of “famine” “abundance”  “waste” and “niggarding” which are typified by the line, 
“Thyself thy foe, to thy sweet self too cruel.”  The Narcissistic youth in his gluttony 
rather than preserving himself saps his own vitality by amassing it for himself, 
“niggarding.”  Burrow integrates the meaning of “tender” into the whole poem 
glossing it as, “the sensitivity of the Fair Youth makes his lack of an heir, an ignoble 
meanness.”  
 
 
The couplet is marked both by disillusion and perplexity.  There is a sense of 
disenchantment and disappointment in the penultimate line as if the hopes and 
desires of the first line of the poem have turned out to be false “From fairest 
creatures we desire increase”.  The “desire” rather than enlarging the world with the 
beauty of the Fair Youth’s progeny is “contracted” by the Youth’s “glutton” (1.13).  
The Youth through greed and miserliness has jeopardized the beauty owing to the 
world, “to eat the world’s due” (1.14).  The ambiguity of line 14 “To eat the world’s 
due by the grave and thee.” creates a paradox, as the manifest injunction of the 
poem is, “to give away yourself,” (16.13) as it is used in Sonnet 16, ”To give away 
yourself, keeps your self still,” (16.13).  In Sonnet 1 giving your self away by 
preserving the line of descent is proved an unfulfilled wish.  On the other hand the 
grave and the Fair Youth are symbolically equated in the same way as self-
preservation of Narcissism is seen by Freud (1920) to be part of the death instinct as 
it leads life back to the inorganic state.  Conversely the grave nourishes life in the 
sense of the proverb ‘dust to dust’. Duncan-Jones clarifies that the young man 
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consumes the beauty that is owed to the world “world’s due” (1.14) and he is finally 
devoured by the grave because dying is commonly referred to as paying one’s debt 
to nature.  Ironically, the Fair youth in his self-sufficiency transforms into the grave 
itself with no debt outstanding as he has taken nothing from the world and therefore 
has nothing to return to the world.  The last line of the poem leaves the reader with 
an eerie feel.  This is because narcissism is a fantasy and as fantasy leaves no 
material trace of the self in the world. 
 
 
Sonnet 1, 2 and 4 extend the wishful-theme that through an heir the Fair Youth will 
preserve his beauty in perpetuity.  This enlarges the Freudian discussion of the life 
and death instinct as conjugation between two different cells enhances and 
rejuvenates the life of the two different cells and leads to immortality, whereas 
narcissism leads to mortality.  The Poet articulates a similar view, “This were to be 
new made when thou art old, / And see thy blood warm when thou feel’st it cold.” 
(2.14) and again in the paradox of the couplet of Sonnet 4, “Thy unus’d beauty must 
be tomb’d with thee, / Which used lives th’executor to be.” (4.13-14).  In Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (1920. p.f.l.11.316), Freud explains this experience of rejuvenation 
and immortality, 
 
“Whereas the sexual instinct though it is true that they reproduce primitive 
states of the organism what they are clearly aiming at by every possible means 
is the coalescence of two germ cells which are differentiated in a particular way.  
If this union is not effected the germ cells dies along with all the other elements 
of the multicellular organism.  It is only on this condition that the sexual function 
can prolong the life of a cell and lend it the appearance of immortality” 
(1920.p.f.l. 11.316).  
 
 
Both Sonnet 2 and 4 demonstrate the way in which the objectionable idea of 
narcissism and egoism is disguised and distorted into derivatives of the unconscious 
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and in this way the abstract concept of narcissism is figuratively transformed.  In the 
Interpretation of Dreams (S.E., Vol.5, 349) Freud writes, 
 
“A thing that is pictorial is from the point of view of a dream, a thing that is 
capable of being represented. “This pouring of a thought into another mould 
may at the same time serve the purpose of the activity of condensation and 
may create connections, which might not otherwise have been present, with 
some other thought” (S.E. V. 349). 
 
Therefore, through the condensed word pictures of metaphor and displacement or 
metonymy, the abstract concept of narcissism is transformed into visual pictures of 
the derivatives of narcissism, which make it possible to evade the Censor.  If the 
Poet had used pejorative abstract concepts like narcissistic, egotistic, selfish, self-
orientated self-love, masturbation the reader rather than experiencing and identifying 
with the sentiments expressed in the poem would have found the poetry judgmental 
if not boring and turned away from it as the reader would have been adverse to 
experiencing it or identifying with it.  The Poet transforms the objectionable censure 
into commonly held financial, agricultural metaphors and bodily sensations with 
which the reader can readily identify.   
  
 
 In Sonnets 2 and 4 the abstract concepts of narcissism and altruism are concealed 
within metaphors, which deal with beauty either as the investment of money for profit 
or miserly self-defeating financial conservatism where beauty is represented as being 
misused rather than invested for the benefit of descendants.  In Sonnet 2 The fair 
Youth’s desire to preserve his beauty for himself is infused with a sense of cold death 
rather than well-being, “blood warm” (2.14) in the same way that the consequence of 
“glutton” (1.13) in the Fair Youth is transformed into “famine” (1.7).  In Sonnet 2 
praise again turns to blame and shame.  The poem creates a cold death-like feel in 
the imagery of “Winters” (2.1) in the violence and impotence against death in 
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“besiege” (2.1).   The beauty of the Fair-youth is converted into an oppressive sense 
of death.  This is conveyed in images of “cold” (2.4) old age with “deep-sunken eyes,” 
(2.7) while “deep trenches” describe ground-in worry lines.  The linking of “old” (2.13) 
with “cold” and “tottered weed” (2.14) is contrasted to more life perpetuating 
representations, “blood warm”, visual descriptions of insignia in “ proud livery” (2.3) of 
commerce “sum my count” (2.11), which create a metaphorical contrast to the 
destruction of the beauty of the Fair Youth as he is humbled like a bent “totter’d weed” 
with no heir to present a balanced audit of the way he used his beauty during his life.  
Through quantifiable images of accountancy “sum my count” (2.11) the heir or the 
child is symbolically equated with financial investment, “Shall sum my count,” that 
can be added up to show a balance or subtracted as evidence of either the thrift or 
extravagance of the Fair Youth towards his descendants.  From this perspective 
Booth (1977.139) notes that the heir or child will in effect act both as evidence and as 
lawyer condemning the father for the consumption of beauty expended during his life 
on himself and for not leaving it to heirs.  
 
 
Sonnet 4 is comprised of oxymoron like “Unthrifty loveliness” (4.1), “beauteous 
niggard” (4.5), “Profitless usurer” (4.7) and antithetical themes like, “..spend, / Upon 
thy self”  (4,1-2)  as opposed to, “Nature’s bequest gives nothing but doth lend,” (4.3) 
and “…why dost thou use, / So great a sum of sums yet canst not live?” (4.7-8) and  
in “…traffic with thy self alone,” (4.10).  An alternative life-style to “Thy unus’d beauty 
must be tom’d with thee, is offered to the Fair-youth in the final line of the poem,  
“Which used lives th’exector to be.” (4. 13-14). The Poet’s use of “of thy self” (4.10) 
presents “the self” not as an external other but as the mirror-self or loved-object of 
the self or an internal part of the Ego in the same way as does Richard 11 above.   
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Sonnet 4 suggests the paradox as well as co-existence inherent in libidinal and 
destructive parts of Narcissism, “Thou of thy self thy sweet self dost deceive” (4.10) 
which reiterates, “Thyself thy foe, to thy sweet self too cruel:” (1.8).  On the one hand 
the Fair Youth is presented as incorporating everything that is of value in the external 
world as part of him.  This is apparent in  “Nature’s bequest” (4.3) and, “The 
bounteous largess given thee to give?” (4.6); whilst on the other hand illogically even 
with this the Narcissist, “canst not live?” (4.8). This waste is the result of his 
idealization of the omnipotent destructive parts of the self which are directed both 
against any positive libidinal object-relationship and any libidinal part of the self which 
experiences need for an object and the desire to depend on it.  The Poet articulates 
this self-exclusion as, “For having traffic with thy self alone” (4.9) which echoes the 
line in, “Feed’st thy light’s flame with self-substantial fuel,” and “Thy unus’d beauty 
must be tomb’d with thee” (4.13). The Poet presents this sense of libidinal and 
destructive narcissism as an oxymoron “beauteous niggard.”  On the one hand 
libidinal narcissism is portrayed in pictures of “Nature’s bequest” in images of 
“bounteous largess” “frank” and “free” (4.4) while on the other hand destructive 
narcissism diminishes the self and presents an opposing verbal picture of “niggard” 
and “can’st not live?”  In the oxymoron, “Profitless usurer” (4.7) the Fair-youth is 
painted as a money-lender who makes no profit from his beauty and as such the 
“unus’d beauty must be tomb’d with thee,” (4.13).  Yet again this sonnet repeats the 
conflict between mortality and immortality or the life and death instinct, only in this 
sonnet mortality and immortality are reduced to financial metaphors, either materially 
advantaging or depriving descendants. 
 
 
As afore discussed the abstract concept of narcissism when poured into a different 
mould as word pictures is experienced and identified with; rather than if it is held in 
an abstract form of didactic knowledge. The metaphor “traffic” indicates movement 
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and in Freudian terms signifies “exchange of bodily fluid in the conjugation between 
two different cells” (Freud 1920).  The verb “traffic” also implies commerce between 
different peoples, which binds people together in ever-greater unities or what Freud 
(1920) defines as the sexual or life instinct.  This instinct for life in the words of the 
Poet is expressed as “Nature’s bequest” or what is bequeathed or entrusted to the 
next generation.  In Freud’s words, “It is only on this condition that the sexual 
function can prolong the life of a cell and lend it the appearance of immortality” 
(1920.316).  
 
“if this union is not effected the germ-cell dies along with all the other elements 
of the multicellular organism” and the death instinct draws life back to the 
inanimate state (1920. p.f.l. 11. 316).   
 
In the words of the Poet this waste of possibility results in, “Thy unus’d beauty must 
be tomb’d with thee.” The phrase in line 13 of Sonnet 4, “…must be tomb’d with thee” 
describes the static, unchanging, un-modifiable nature of narcissism as opposed to 
the movement of ever-greater unities or “traffic” of the life instinct or Eros and “Which 
used lives th’exector to be” (4.14). This sonnet together with Sonnets 1 and 2 in the 
view held here illustrate the fundamental opposition presented by Freud in his 
dualistic theory of the instincts of self-preservation as opposed to the preservation of 
the species. 
 
The dualistic tendency in Freudian thought manifests not only in self-preservation 
when it is opposed to preservation of the species but in the notion of pairs of 
opposites.  Hate is commonly thought of as the opposite of love but this is not always 
the case according to Freud in Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915. p.f.l. 11. 105-
139).  Sadism and hate are not derived from the sexual instincts of love but from the 
instinct of self-preservation to maintain itself.  In this lecture (1915. p.f.l.11.137) 
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Freud writes masochism was seen to be sadism turned around on the subject’s self.  
Hate was seen to be a separate instinct and was seen to be older than love, 
 
“Hate derives from the narcissistic ego’s primordial repudiation of the external 
world with its outpouring of stimuli… it always remains in an intimate relation 
with the self-preservative instinct; so that the sexual and ego-instincts can 
readily develop an antithesis which repeats that of love and hate” (1915.p.f.l. 
11.137). 
 
 
Freud writing again in his lecture The Two classes of Instincts in the The Ego and the 
Id writes about the transformation of love into hate, 
 
“..It is clear that here the changes are purely internal and an alteration in the 
behavior of the external object plays no part in them” (1923. p.f.l. 11. 384).  
 
In 1920 Freud included within the Death Instinct narcissism masochism, sadism, hate 
and ambivalence whereas aggression was viewed as a separate instinct.  Sonnet 10 
calls attention to Empson’s theory of ambiguity, which is the outcome of the divided 
mind and in the Poet’s poetry is actualized in the Poet’s ambivalent attitude to the 
Fair Youth.  The Poet in Sonnet 10 takes the sense of procreation back to its roots in 
love, but conversely this sonnet is not about the celebration of love and life but by 
contrast forms the Poet’s reproach to the Fair-Youth for his lack of love towards any, 
“For shame deny that thou bear’st love to any” (10.1).  This sonnet does not repeat 
the Fair-Youth’s self-love rather the Poet in this sonnet upbraids the Youth for not 
loving at all, “But that thou none lov’st is most evident” (10.4).  In relation to a 
destructive form of narcissism, Freud raises the question,  “what makes it necessary 
at all for our mental life to pass beyond the limits of narcissism and to attach the 
libido to objects?” (1914.11.78).  Freud explains when the cathexis of the Ego 
exceeds a certain amount,  
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“A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, but in the last resort we must 
begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence 
of frustration, we are unable to love” (1914.11.78).  
 
The tone of Sonnet 10 changes from the universal “we” (1.1) to the specific “me” 
(10.13).  Here the Poet indicates that he has a personal relationship to the Fair Youth 
in “Make thee an other self for love of me,” (10.13).  The tone of sonnet also changes 
from berating the Fair-Youth for his self-love to rebuking him for his hate towards 
others in a destructive form of narcissism or “murd’rous hate” (10.5) which turns 
around on the subject’s self, “gainst thy self” (10.6).  
 
 
Sonnet 10 appears to follow the sentiments expressed in the couplet of Sonnet 9, 
“No love toward others in that bosom sits / That on himself such murd’rous shame 
commits. (9.13-14).  Sonnet 10 opens with a contradiction.  On the one hand the 
Fair-Youth is represented as despising others, “But that thou none lov’st is most 
evident:” (10.4) but conversely he is beloved of many.”  The first line therefore starts 
with a rebuke that out of a sense of shame or humility the Fair Youth should own or 
take responsibility for his lack of love towards others rather than deny that “thou 
bear’st love to any” (10.1).  There is a sense in this poem of the Poet pleading with 
the Youth not to be so reckless “unprovident” (10.2), or according to Crystal and 
Crystal (2002.421xli) to think twice “stick’st” (10.6).  As afore discussed narcissism is 
unrelated to reality and therefore part of the pleasure principle which like the 
impulses of the dream strive for immediate gratification of pleasure.  Notwithstanding 
in this poem the negation “not” (10.6) according to Freud xlii(1925. 438) reverses the 
stated negative meaning of the proposition to the affirmative,  
 
“To negate something in judgement is, at bottom, to say: ‘This is something I 
should prefer to repress.’ A negative judgement is the intellectual substitute for 
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repression, its ‘no’ is the hall-mark of repression, a certificate of origin – like, let 
us say, ‘Made in Germany’” (1925.11.438). 
 
 
The lines,  “For thou art so possess’d with murd’rous hate, / That ‘gainst thy self thou 
stick’st not to conspire” (10.5-6) therefore reads, you are so “possess’d” (10.5) or 
demonically controlled by hate that against yourself you plot your own destruction.  
This is the irony of narcissism, rather than turning towards the self in self-love and 
self-protection hate turns against the self and destroys the Fair-Youth.  The 
synecdoche “beauteous roof” (10.7) according to Booth (1977.148-149) 
metaphorically stands for the head, whole body, lineage, or house.  The assonance 
of “ruinate” in relation to “roof” (10.7) links the sense of spoiling of something good 
and beautiful, like the line of descent to “roof” and ruins or spoils it.  Line 8 of Sonnet 
10 disrupts the sense of harm and damage thus far expressed in the first two 
quatrains of this sonnet and transforms the sense of “unprovident’  “murd’rous” , 
“ruinate” to the opposite in a benign wish for “repair” (10.8).  The Poet again in this 
sonnet presents the Fair-Youth with an alternative, “Shall hate be fairer lodg’d than 
gentle love?”  (10.10).  The Poet’s use of the metaphor “lodg’d” links back to the 
Poet’s use of the demonic sense of “posssess’d” (10.5) as if an evil malevolent spirit 
were ingrained or imprisoned in the body, head or line of descent “possess’d”  by, the 
Fair-Youth.  According to Crystal and Crystal (2002.344)  “presence” signifies 
‘appearance, bearing, demeanour, which returns the concept of narcissism to that of 
the mirror-self where the superficial self-reflection of Richard’s 11’s mirror-self 
deceives him.  In Richard’s words, “O flatt’ring glass, / Thou dost beguile me!”    Line 
12 of Sonnet 10 appears to differentiate external presence or appearance from 
internal feeling, “or to thy self at least kind-hearted prove” (10.12). According to 
Duncan-Jones the external appearance of the Fair-Youth appears to be amiable in 
intention by contrast to the internal feeling of the Fair-Youth, which is unnatural and 
insensitive and suggests “fresh ornament” and the mirror-self of narcissism.  The line 
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“Make thee an other self for love of me,” can be taken literally as produce an heir or 
figuratively in transform your moral character.  The last line of the Sonnet reveals the 
Poet’s uncertainty of the enduring nature of beauty through an heir in material 
procreation, “that beauty still may live in thine or thee,” (10.14). 
 
 
At the heart of the first Shakespearean sonnets is a symbolic fear of mortality or the 
transience of beauty.  In Sonnet 1 this fear is metaphorically and metonymically 
articulated as “That thereby beauty’s Rose might never die,” (1.2), in Sonnet 2, 
“Where all the treasure of thy lusty days;” (2.6), in Sonnet 3, “ “Or who is he so fond 
will be the tomb, / Of his self-love to stop posterity?” (3.7-8).  The fear of the brevity 
of the life is voiced in Sonnet 4 as, “Nature’s bequest gives nothing but doth lend, / 
And being frank she lends to those are free:” (4.3-4), and finally in Sonnet 10 the 
Poet concerns himself with hate as it destroys love when experienced in relationship.  
On the one hand the Fair Youth is loved by others “Grant if thou wilt, thou art beloved 
of many,” (10.3), whilst on the other hand, “But that thou none lov’st is most evident.”  
This fear of loss or mortality is experienced by the Poet as anxiety which takes the 
form of recrimination against the Fair-Youth for his self-serving self-sufficiency, “self-
substantial fuel”  (1.6), his gluttony, “Pity the world, or else this glutton be,” (1. 13), 
and his negligence,  “Then being ask’d, where all thy beauty lies / To say within thine 
own deep-sunken eyes” (2.7).  Furthermore the Poet reproaches the Fair Youth for 
his refusal to marry “Disdains the tillage of thy husbandry?” (3.6) and for using his 
own beauty or sperm for his own sexual purposes, “Then beauteous niggard why 
dost thou abuse” (4.5).  Finally the Fair-Youth’s hate towards himself is projected as 
hate towards others, “But that thou none lov’st is most evident:” (10.4).  As afore 
discussed given that death is part of life, the wish for immortality appears fanciful.  
However, through the experience of the Poet’s poetry the wish for immortality 
becomes credible; whereas if the sentiments expressed had been in the form of 
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abstract knowledge the Poet’s poetry would have seemed moralistic and intolerable.  
Although Narcissism manifests as self-love or hate towards others; it is a defence 
against loss of relationship to others, 
 
“When the ego assumes the features of the object, it is forcing itself, so to 
speak, upon the id as love-object and trying to make good the id’s loss by 
saying; “Look, you can love me too – I am so like the object.” (1923. p.f.l.11. 
369). 
 
 Freud, writing again in the Ego and the Id (1923. p.f.l. 11. 369) xliii  explains this 
indifference to the sexual object as desexualisation of libido, 
 
“The transformation of object-libido into narcissistic libido which thus takes 
place obviously implies an abandonment of sexual aims, a desexualisation – a 
kind of sublimation, therefore. Indeed, the question arises, and deserves 
careful consideration, whether this is not the universal road to sublimation”. 
(1923.p.f.l. 11. 369). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
In relation to his concept of sublimation, Freud goes on to postulate in “ ‘Civilized  
Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness’ “ (1908. S.E. 1X. 189), that in relation to 
human activities which have no apparent connection with sexuality but which are 
assumed to be motivated by the same force or energy of the sexual instinct are those 
which are described by Freud as sublimated.  These are artistic creation and 
intellectual inquiry.  In this case, the instinct is described as sublimated in so far as it 
is diverted towards a new, non-sexual aim and in so far as its objects are socially 
valued ones.  In this way the Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets symbolically sublimates 
(1908. S.E. 1X, 189) his wish for the concrete immortality of beauty through the Fair-
Youth’s progeny to a more realistic desire for the symbolic immortality of beauty to be 
found in the Poet’s poetry about beauty,  
 
“When in eternal lines to time thou grow’st, 
So long as men can breathe or eyes can see, 
So long lives this, and this gives life to thee,” (18.12-14). 
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Chapter  3 
 
 
 
The Wisdom of Wit in Shakespeare’s Sonnets. 
 
 
 
Iago. “Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls: 
Who steals my purse steals trash;  ‘tis something – 
   Nothing, 
‘Twas mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands. 
But he that filtches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him 
And makes me poor indeed.  
 
Shakespeare,W. Oth. Act 3.Sc.3. 160-165. 
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Iago in Act 3 in Shakespeare’s Play Othello
xlvii
xliv, symbolically equates honour with a 
person’s name.  Yet if the above quotation is taken literally it is a person’s name that 
can be stolen from him.  This raises a conundrum as a name is integral to a person’s 
personality and as such cannot be stolen; yet no person is born with a name, a name 
is given to him; yet it becomes as fundamental to his personality as is his thumb-print. 
The excerpt from Othello raises the question of the legitimacy of the signifier’s link 
with its signified that is, the link between the integrity of the physical aspect of the 
word as a sign or signifier and its concrete signified in the person to whom it refers 
and belongs.  In Sonnet 135 and 136 the Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets presents 
his name in the form of a joke or a witty play on words and in so doing he subverts 
the meaning of his name and the conventional meaning of love.  This subterfuge 
displays his wisdom in guarding the honour of his literary reputation.  According to 
both de Saussurexlv and Freudxlvi  there is no intrinsic existential link between the 
acoustic image or signifier and its signified or the interpreted word.  Furthemore, it is 
because of the looseness of the connection between signifier and signified that 
meaning becomes destabilized and the same signifier as a thing, sign or symptom 
used in a different context can signify some meaning completely different.  This 
subversion of meaning introduces ambiguity and contradiction into the reading of the 
Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets. 
 
 
This chapter examines Sonnet 135, 136, 121 at three levels of meaning.  The first is 
that of de Saussure xlviii  who raises the question of the relationship between the 
arbitrary nature of the signifier or acoustic image or sound to the word or signified. 
For Saussure the signifier is the physical aspect of the word as a sign as distinct from 
its meaning.  Freud xlix  from a psychoanalytic perspective offers a different 
perspective of the same problem.  Here, the conscious presentation” [interpreted 
word] “comprises the presentation of the thing or subjective visual presentation or 
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signifier plus the presentation of the word or meaning belonging to it; while the 
unconscious presentation is of the thing alone (1915.p.f.l.11.207).  According to 
Freud this vorstellung or the subjective idea or memory of a thing Vorstellung is what 
emanates from the object or the external world and is only made conscious through 
its link with an interpreted word.   Some authors such as La Planche and Pontalis 
(1973.205) l  have felt justified in comparing Freud’s concept of Vorstellung or 
representation with the linguistic notion of the signifier, which was coined by de 
Saussure above.  The Poet in Sonnet 135 and 136 exploits this arbitrary connection 
between signifier and signified or thing and word in the form of a witty play on words 
which at the manifest level seemingly imply the name of the Poet, while at the latent 
level decode as sexual lust.  The second level of investigation relates to the analysis 
of the sonnets.  Freud’s analysis of Jokesli is applied to Sonnet 135 and 136 and 
focuses on the ‘contradiction’ in language as it mirrors the contradiction within the 
mind between the manifest and latent interpretation of Sonnet 135 and Sonnet 136.  
Conversely Sonnet 121 is created out of a ‘compromise’ between the objectivity of 
the preconscious and the subjectivity of the unconscious. This compromise 
generates a third signified which is a composite of reality and the unconscious and 
which colours reality with a subjective hue.   The third level of analysis relates to the 
contradiction between  “am I” (135.3) and “I am” (121.9).  This is glossed according 
to Winnicott’s theory of “I am” in Ego Distortion in Terms of True and False Self 
(1960.140-153)lii.  According to Lionel Bailly (209. 118-122)liii who interprets Jacques 
Lacan (1901 -1981) there is a fine line in play between pleasure and pleasure, which 
if crossed transforms pleasure into pain.  This chapter views the Poet’s wisdom in 
setting his overt literary self and his covert erotic voice in the form of a joke and in so 
doing the Poet attempts to circumvent what might have been moral reproaches by 
the Super-ego to his literary self. In his article on Humour (1927. S.E. 21. 165-166)liv, 
 
 57 
“A joke is thus the contribution made to the comic by the unconscious. In just 
the same way, humour would be the contribution made to the comic through 
the agency of the super-ego.” 
 
Freud explains this as the Super-ego in its representation as social authority figures 
condescendingly allowing the ego to obtain a small yield of pleasure by consoling it 
rather than criticizing it for the tendentious nature of the joke.  
 
 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1998) divided language into two parts the signifier or 
acoustic image and its signified or concept.  According to Saussure there is no 
existential link between the signifier and its signified.  For Saussure, the link between 
the two was seen by him to be arbitrary and merely a social convention accepted by 
all users of a given language.  Language according to Saussure has a social aspect, 
which enables members of the same society to use their common language faculty 
by collective agreement.  According to de Saussure language also has an individual 
aspect and this feature of language shows the way the individual uses language to 
express personal thought.  Freud on the other hand was primarily interested in the 
interpretation of the signifier or unconscious ideational representative, Vorstellung or 
thing.  The idea or Vorstellung is the idea that represents the instinct or the 
relationship between soma or body and psyche or mind.  The “idea” in Freud’s theory 
is always the “un-thought known” (Bollas.1987.277) in unconscious and represents 
the subjective element or what one represents to oneself about the object.  Freud in 
his article Word and things (Appendix C. 1915. p.f.l.11.216-223) lv  and in his 
monograph on Aphasia (1891b)lvi identifies four components of the word presentation.  
The sound-image, the visual letter-image, the motor speech-image and the writing-
image.  A word is thus a complex presentation consisting of the images enumerated 
above.  In the same way that Roman Jakobson (1998. 56-61) lvii  identified 
disturbances of speech in aphasia as occurring in either the selection axis or 
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metaphoric pole or combination axis or metonymic pole so does Freud classify first 
level aphasia or verbal aphasia as the breakdown of the separate elements of the 
word presentation or the reading, writing and motor image components. Second 
order aphasia or asymbolic aphasia occurs when the association between the word 
presentation and the thing presentation is disturbed.  The Poet of Shakespeare’s 
sonnets takes advantage of the dissociation between the word and thing-
presentation particularly in Sonnet 135 and 136 where the proper name of the Poet 
as aforesaid is applied to various thing representations and contexts with the 
intention of producing a witty rhetorical effect rather than the some deep meaning or 
signified. 
 
 
Stephen Booth (1977.466-469)lviii writes that “Sonnets 135 and 136 are festivals of 
verbal ingenuity in which much of the fun derives from the grotesque lengths the 
speaker goes to for a maximum number and concentration of puns on Will or will.  At 
the manifest level of the poem or signifier, “will or Will” signify “one’s will” or “what 
one wishes to have or do”.  The words “wish” and “will” (135.1) in “thy Will” (135.1) 
imply “willfulness” or “wanting one’s own way”.  Alternatively “Will” (135.1) becomes a 
proper name or the abbreviation of the Poet’s name.  On the other hand it may imply 
the name of the Poet’s friend.  The phrase, “thou hast thy will” (135.1) becomes a 
proverb recorded by Tilley’s and referred to by Booth as, “wedded to one’s will” 
(Tilley W392).  Notwithstanding according to Booth the meaning of “will”or “Will ” in 
Sonnet 135 and Sonnet 136 mean “sexual desire” or a word for both “male and 
female sexual organs.”  This transforms the signified or latent reading of these 
sonnets into a very bawdy reading. 
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In this chapter what is commonly referred to as the Will  poems or Sonnet 135 and 
Sonnet 136 are not seen as superficial or meaningless but in line with Winnicott’s 
theory of Communicating and Not Communicating Leading to a Study of Certain 
Opposites (1963.187) lix  these sonnets are seen to represent the Poet’s sincere 
attempt to remain as “isolated” or remote as he was in the sonnets addressed to the 
young man where according to Fineman (1986.6-7) in ostensibly writing about the 
object the Poet is in fact writing about himself.  By contrast in Sonnet 135 and 136 
the poet does not remain concealed in the person of the Loved-object but 
nonetheless remains “insulated” and protected within his literary persona.  
Winnicott’s central statement in this paper is “that every individual is an isolate and 
therefore the right not to communicate must be respected” (1963.186).  In relation to 
the above quote by Winnicott the Poet of the young man sonnets (1-126) allows 
himself to become subsumed within the young man’s invective and praise but by 
contrast the Poet of Sonnets 135 and 136 seemingly exposes himself by apparently 
at the manifest reading of the poem speaking his name overtly, “Will”.  He does so in 
the form of a joke so that this naming of himself is not taken as verifiable evidence of 
his personality but rather a witty way with words which covertly signifies sexual 
desire.  Using this motive and rhetorical device the Poet as craftsman and writer, 
rather than as participant in the represented relationship remains isolated from the 
glare of social and moral condemnation that might arise from the lewd nature of the 
double-entendre in the play on the word “will” or “Will”.   Consequently at the 
manifest level of the poem the Poet appears not to insulate himself and seems to 
reveal himself in his name “Will” while at the latent level he cloaks what Winnicott 
refers to as his “true self” (1960.148) by presenting the covert meaning of his name 
in the form of lustful joke or play on the word Will or “Will” (135.1).  The appearance 
of “Will” as his name rather than the reality of the bawdy undertone at the concealed 
latent level is not taken seriously but nevertheless allows the Poet to remain 
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insulated.  Winnicott (1960. 144-148) in his article Ego distortion in terms of the True 
and False Self”  writes, 
 
“Only the True Self can be creative and only the True Self can feel real, the 
existence of a False Self results in feeling unreal or a sense of futility” (1960 
148). 
 
This chapter attempts to unlock the wisdom of this strategy in the paradox presented 
by Winnicott in his article Communicating and Not Communicating Leading to a 
Study of Certain Opposites (1963.187).  On the one hand Will presents himself as a 
name but on the other an erotic joke which according to Booth represents “one 
universal appetitive will or Will uniting all lovers and the sexual organs of both sexes 
into himself.”  In this fashion Will or will conceals his true identity in the question he 
poses in the first line of Sonnet 136, “If thy soul check thee that I come so near.” 
(136.1).  In Ego Distortion of the True and False Self (1960. 144-148) Winnicott 
credits poets as people who feel intensely with a concern for truth.  Winnicott writes, 
 
“Poet, philosophers and seers have always concerned themselves with the 
idea of a true self, and the betrayal of the self has been a typical example of 
the unacceptable….Shakespeare perhaps to avoid being smug, gathered 
together a bundle of truths and handed them out to us by the mouth of a 
crashing bore called Polonius.  In this way we can take the advice: 
 
‘This above all: to thine own self be true, 
And it must follow, as the night the day, 
Thou canst not then be false to any man’” (Ham. Act. 1.Sc.111. 78-81).lx 
 
To communicate or not to communicate presents in the artists of all kinds a dilemma 
(1963) which belongs to the co-existence of two trends; one is the urgent need to 
communicate; while the other by contrast is the still more urgent need “not be found” 
or to remain isolated and private. (Winnicott:1963).  Given this self- contradiction in 
the artist the Poet in Sonnet 135 and 136 appears to solve the dilemma by 
presenting his name in the form of a play on words which allows his auditor to enjoy 
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the latent obscene trend of the above sonnets against the weight of the social 
pressure of censorship and the criticism of the Superego which would normally lead 
the artist to repress this trend in himself.  
 
 
According to Freud (1905.p.f.l. 6. 40-44)lxi a joke is a playful judgment characterized 
by the condition that we do not ask anything of the object except the aesthetic 
attitude that we bring to the enjoyment of merely contemplating it.  A Joke represents 
a rebellion against authority, a liberation from pressure” (1905. p.f.l. 6. 149) and 
therefore jokes bring forward something that is concealed or hidden. The comic is 
concerned with bringing into view the ugly and any form of pretense, insincerity, or 
hypocrisy.  Accordingly this is uncovered and brought forward in the light of the 
comic way of looking at things (1905. p.f.l. 6. 44).  Tendentious jokes make use of a 
play on words and in this way caricature and parody come about.  Jokes are the 
arbitrary connecting or linking usually by means of verbal association of two ideas, 
which in some way contrast with each other.  Freud identifies the characteristics of 
jokes as brevity, which is the outcome of the process of condensation. The process 
of condensation exploits the multiple use of the same word creating a double 
meaning or play on words.  From the doubleness of meaning formed by 
condensation a replacement satisfaction is shaped in the in the form of a substitute 
satisfaction or joke.  Different meanings are created often from the juxtaposition of 
literal or metaphorical meanings or the juxtaposition of proper names with physical 
things or through allusion (1905.p.f.l. 6. 69).  The purpose of the play according to 
Hamlet and also of the dramatist who creates the play is “to hold as ‘twere, the mirror 
up to nature’ to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age 
and body of the time his form and pressure” (Ham. Act 111 Sc. 11. 22-24).  Play on 
words in the adult has its origins in childhood and the enjoyment in jokes as adults is 
that a joke is put back for a moment to the state of childhood so that once more we 
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gain possession of the childish source of pleasure.  Children play with the sound of a 
homophone in different contexts.  When we laugh at children’s playfulness with 
words we are uncovering the unconscious material of jokes in the adult that has been 
dammed up by rational criticism in the course of intellectual development. 
 
 
Freud (1905. p.f.l. 6.161 ) also comments that that the purpose in jokes is to question 
the nature of “truth” and jokes do this by destabilizing deeply held values and 
standards of morality.  A variation of the Poet’s playing with his name as an unfixed 
signifier is the Poet’s playing with him name as an identity, ‘Will-I-am’.  This 
designation of him as ‘Will-I-am’ challenges prevailing normative assumptions about 
what is socially acceptable.  This cratylism questions the norms that assign stability 
and rigid meanings to what ‘truth’ signifies more especially in a world where moral 
standards are constantly in flux.  By so doing the nature of truth is destabilized.  The 
Poet confronts the permanence and validity of moral standards in his name ‘Will-I-
am’.  The way in which the Poet does this is in, “No, I am that I am, and they that 
level / At my abuses, reckon up their own,” (121.9-10). In a different manifestation of 
this challenge the interrogative “am I” evokes the corporeality in the name of the Poet 
as “Will “am I” (135.3).  This is apparent in the first two lines of Sonnet 135 where the 
notion that women are sexually reticent is undermined because in the first line the 
reader is confronted with a determined woman who is sexually voracious, “thou hast 
thy Will,” (135.1).  According to the poem the auditor is no longer dealing with fantasy 
or desire, but with the reality of sexual appetite.  Line 3 suggests that it is not only the 
woman to whom the poem is addressed who is sexually insatiable but also the Poet, 
“More than enough am I that vex thee still,”.  In Sonnet 121, “No, I am that I am, and 
they that level” also appears to question the solidity and constancy of moral 
standards but here it is through the Jesuitical principle of respect for the freedom of 
conscience and the adoption of case by case judgment to personal moral decision, 
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“While in their will count bad what I think good?” (121.8).  Both the sense of “I am” in 
Sonnet 121 and “am I” in Sonnet 135 appear to confront conventional standards of 
what is morally acceptable.   
 
 
The latent level of both sonnets appears also to focus on and articulate the Kleinian 
concept of projective identification (1946.1-25).lxii  Here, the subject projects on to the 
object or other the anti-social parts of the self that they unconsciously disown, “Which 
in their wills count bad what I think good?”(121.8).   Alternatively, “I may be straight 
though they themselves be bevel / By their rank thoughts, my deed must not be 
shown (121. 11-12).  The Poet’s use of “bevel” pours the abstract Kleinian concept of 
projective–identification into a different mould as a word-picture or metaphor which is 
more readily grasped and identified with by the reader than the psychoanalytic 
concept.  The Poet equates the intransitive verb “bevel” or slanting or crooked edge 
of the mirror with a person who is in him or herself like the bent “bevel” crooked glass 
at the edge of the mirror and the use of “bevel” when it refers to a person is 
metaphorically thought of as not “straight” or honest because the mental reflection 
given by the other is “bevel” in that it is not true but biased.  The use of the image of 
a mirror equates the mirror reflection with reflective thought and gives rise to the 
impression of a person who reflects or reveals their own estimate of the Poet with 
shades of their own internal values and attitudes attached, “bevel.”  This metonymic 
substitution of part of the subject into the whole object yields a projected or a 
distorted image of the Poet in the same way as the “bevel” of a mirror does.  
 
 
The Winnicottian perspective of “I am”, in Sonnet 121 “No, I am that I am, and they 
that level” (121.11) and the “am I”  (135.3) appears to be equally pertinent to a 
reading of Sonnet 135 and Sonnet 136 as it draws the Poet’s various uses of his 
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name into one whole or integrated “Will.”  This appears in, “Think all but one, and me 
in that one Will.” (135.14) and “Make but my name thy love, and love that still, / And 
then thou lov’st me for my name is Will” (136. 13-14).  First according to Winnicott 
(1962) comes “I”, which includes everything else which is “not me”.  This can be seen 
in the difference between the subjectivity of the Poet in the young man series where 
the Poet is a participant part of the idealization or denigration of the young man as 
identified by Fineman (1986. 291) and the subjectivity of the “I” in “am I’ and “I come 
so near” (136.1) in the Will sonnets and the “No, I am that I am” in Sonnet 121.  
According to Winnicott first comes “I am, I exist”, I gather experiences and enrich 
myself and have an introjective and projective interaction with the “Not-Me”, the 
actual world of shared reality, 
 
“For why should others’ false adulterate eye, 
Give salutation to my sportive blood? 
Or on my frailties why are frailer spies; 
Which in their will count bad what I think good?” (Sonnet 121.5-8). 
 
Winnicott continues “Add to this, “I am seen or understood to exist by someone and 
further add to this: I get back (as a face seen in a mirror) the evidence I need that I 
have been recognized as being” (1962.56-64).  This interpretation of Winnicott 
returns to the Poet’s line in Sonnet 121, “I may be straight though they themselves 
be bevel / By their rank thoughts, my deeds must not be shown.” (121.11-12).  Is the 
face in the mirror “straight” in that it reflects back the Poet’s individuality honestly or 
is it bevel which mirrors the Poet’s personality with a distortion or bias as in, “I may 
be straight though they themselves be bevel” (121.11).  The summation of all the 
parts of within “I am” (135.3) are gathered together in the line “Think all but one, and 
me in that one Will”, or I get back (as a face seen in a mirror) the evidence I need 
that I have been recognized as being” 
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Sonnet 135 and Sonnet 136 according to Duncan-Jones (1997.384)lxiii develop the 
idea of women’s sexual voracity through a play on the two meanings of “Will”  and 
“Will” (136.2).  The first two lines in Sonnet 135,  “Who ever hath her wish, thou hast 
thy Will, / And Will to boot, and Will in over-plus (135. 1-2) differentiate women into 
two different types.  Those women who only have sexual fantasies, her “wish” from 
those that demand genuine sexual activity where “thou” denotes the present past, 
“thou hast thy Will”.  “W” in “Will” is written in the quarto in the Stephen Booth’s 
edition both in italics and in capitals, “Who euer hath her wifh, thou haft thy will, / And 
Will too boote, and Will in ouer-plus, and again in “Swear to thy blind foule that I was 
thy will,” (136.2).   This implies that when “W” is written in italics and in capitals it 
denotes the Poet’s proper name, “Will”.   Conversely according to Booth when “W” 
refers to a common noun the “W” of “W” is put into small letters “will”.  When “w” is 
written in small letters it becomes an unfixable multifunctional signifier.  As a 
common noun will denotes either the penis of the Poet, “thy will” or the vagina of the 
woman to whom the poem is addressed.  By line 2 the reader’s attention is drawn to 
the literal excess of the number of times the word Will or the word will appears on the 
page which creates what Fineman (1986) terms, “a hearable materiality” (1986.290).  
This generates an embodied concrete meaning to the words, ”to boot, and will in 
over-plus” (135.1-2).  The excess of the use of the word “Will” or “will” creates the 
impression of a very demanding suitor or persistent lover when “W” is capitalized or a 
very sexually active male or female when “w” is in small letters.  Alternatively it 
becomes a fleshy and licentious metaphor for an engorged penis or enlarged vagina 
as a consequence of excess use or promiscuity, “Wilt thou, whose will is large and 
spacious, / Not once vouchsafe to hide my will in thine?” (135.5-6).   
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As afore written the signifier is capricious and meaning metamorphoses according to 
the context in which the signifier is found for instance the reader’s attention is drawn 
to the word “am I” which is written in the interrogative form in the line “More than 
enough am I that vex thee still” (135.3).  On the surface the change in word order 
does not appear significant, “More than enough am I” to the way “I am” is used in 
Sonnet (121.9-10), “No, I am that I am” yet its latent reading is significant and alters 
the tone of the meaning critically.  This is apparent in Sonnet 135 because the 
meaning of “will” is covert as it allows for the expression of thoughts that society 
usually suppresses or forbids.  For instance, the many “will” or, “Wilt thou, whose will 
is large and spacious” creates the impression of a large amount of sexual activity 
within one “Will” or person.  Or alternatively as quoted by Booth  “will” can be read as 
a common noun in which case it denotes an enlarged female sexual organ or 
engorged penis.   
 
From a Psychoanalytic perspective the psychological process involved is different in 
a dream from that of a joke.  In a joke there is an interaction but not a compromise  
between social mores and unconscious thoughts, which leaves the contradiction in 
place between repressed forbidden thoughts and feelings and the pre-conscious 
morality of the Super-ego or moral conscience.  Both social mores and unconscious 
thoughts and ideas are overt and manifest simultaneously.  Jokes foreground 
forbidden thoughts and feelings that are normally repressed but by being shown 
simultaneously with permissible thought and by being set in the interrogative form 
“am I” (135.3) these words form a contradiction between hypocrisy or the hypocrisy 
and superficiality of manifest social respectability and covert latent licentiousness. 
 
 
Burrowlxiv (2002.650) notes the bawdy sense of will in line 6 of Sonnet 135 as, “hide 
my penis in your vagina” or he takes the sense of will as signifying “unite your wishes 
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with mine”.  Line 8, “And in my will no fair acceptance shine;” introduces a double-
entendre on the “William who is mine” or “the penis that is mine”.   The negative “no” 
(135.8) brings to the fore the notion that this poem is a love-suit rather than a brag or 
conquest of sexual prowess signified by, “thou hast thy Will” (135.1).  On the contrary 
in line 8 “will no acceptance shine:” appears to emphasize the point that the Poet 
implores the lady to make visible her acceptance or favourable reception of the Poet 
Will or his will or penis, “ in thine” (135.6) or her vagina.  Line 9 of Sonnet 135 
connects sexuality symbolically to its rightful place in nature,  “The sea all water, yet 
receives rain still / And in abundance addeth to his store,” (135. 9-10).  This line 
echoes Orsino’s comment in Twelfth Night  “O spirit of love, how quick and fresh art 
thou / That, notwithstanding thy capacity / Receiveth as the sea, naught enters thee,” 
(1.1.9-11).lxv   Line 12 of Sonnet 35 appears to carry on the sense of acceptance in 
the metaphor of the sea, which compares the lady’s enlarged sexual organ to the sea, 
which like the enlarged vagina goes on receiving and accommodating rain or men.  
The sonnet then goes on to implore the lady to accept one “will” more or one more 
“Will”, “So thou being rich in Will add to thy Will, / One will of mine to make thy large 
Will more” (135.12-12).   These two lines could be glossed as a mere play on the 
name Will which raises the hypothetical question if there are two people named Will 
because both “Will” in the line are written in capitals to whom the lady imparts sexual 
favours or alternatively the phrase, “to make thy large will more” (135.12) or where 
“thy large” refers to the metaphor of the lady’s accommodating vagina which in its 
receptivity symbolically represents the sea. 
 
 
The diacope in the couplet or the repetition of a phrase which is interrupted by a few 
words, formed by the two no’s in line 13, “Let ‘no’ unkind no fair beseechers kill, / 
Think all but one, and me in that one Will.” (135. 13-14) formed by the inverted 
commas around the first ‘no’ appear to imply a spoken denial ‘no’ in ‘no’ [unkind] 
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remark where [unkind] is interpolated.  By contrast the second negative “no”  appears 
to emphasize “no fair” rather than “no beseechers” which suggests the acceptance of 
many suitors rather than one suitor in the poem.  The capacity of her will to 
accommodate “more” returns sexual appetite to its symbolic form in the sea and 
serves to reiterate a very passionate rather than a frigid woman in the line, “Who 
ever hath her wish, thou hast thy Will.”  
 
 
The couplet of Sonnet 135 is beautiful and this harmony is created and shaped by 
the reversal of each line “Let no unkind, no fair beseechers kill, / Think all but one, 
and me in that one Will.”   The comma after “unkind” is mirrored by the inversion of 
the second clause in the same line, “no beseechers kill”.  The same structure is 
repeated in line 14, “Think all but one, and me in that one Will.”  In this way, line 13 is 
musically related to line 14 and together and separately they form a criss-cross 
structure or a chiasmus.  This rhetorical device serves to relate the two lines which 
become associated in the mind like a lyrical chant which emphasizes the name of the 
poet Will, as the only one. 
 
 
Although Sonnet 136 appears on the manifest level designed to emotionally touch 
the addressee as well as the auditor to their very “soul” (136.1), it nonetheless 
echoes the light bawdy tropes of Sonnet 135.  The noun “soul” appears to be a word 
that all use but all interpret differently.  Duncan-Jones (1997.136) glosses it as the 
female sexual organ whereas Booth (1977.469-473) annotates it as the seat of 
intuition or one’s sense of things.  Knowledge seems to strike Hamlet like an 
epiphany, “O my prophetic soul! My Uncle!” Ham. (1.V.41)
lxvii
lxvi.  In Crystal and Crystal 
(2002.409)  soul is the driving force or the animating principle in man and they 
quote, “Will you with free and unconstrained soul” Much Ado (1.1.24) or alternatively 
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in Oth.(1.ii.3), soul becomes integrity, “My parts, my title, and my perfect soul / Shall 
manifest me rightly.”  Finally again according to Crystal and Crystal in Sonnet 136 
“soul” is glossed as real nature or essence of the lady to whom the Poet addresses 
his poem.  “Check thee” in this sonnet implies restrain or stop me from coming so 
near [to your soul] as it does in Two Gentleman of Verona (Act. 4.3.19), “No grief 
ever came so near thy heart.”  In this chapter, “If thy soul check thee that I come so 
near,” (136.1) appears to imply if I make such bold sexual advance where in [suing 
for your love] is interpolated.  Line 2 of Sonnet 136 appears to destabilize the 
meaning of “soul” as it was used in line 1, “Swear to thy blind soul that I was thy Will”.  
Again it is variously interpreted from its literal use as the soul shut up in the body to 
the use of “blind” as it is used in Sonnet 137, “Thou blind fool love”. (137.1).  Here it 
appears to contradict the emotional veracity of the way “soul” was used in line 1 and 
seems pejorative as if the lady referred to lacks insight or is referred to by the Poet in 
her corporeal capacity rather than her spiritual self.  The oxymoron “blind soul” 
appears to cancel out the meaning of insight in “soul” in the way it was used in Ham 
quoted above, which makes of the sense of the signified as insight illogical.  Normally 
soul is accorded a spiritual transcendent significance whereas here it plunges into 
the opposite and becomes the essence of the female addressee’s body.  
 
 
The latter sense of body rather than spirit or intuition appears to carry over into line 
three implying that “thy soul” (136.1&3) knows that “Will” (136.2) is admitted there.  
Here according to Booth (1977.469-473) “soul” (36.3) refers to a woman’s soul as 
well as her genitals.  According to Burrow (2002.652)lxviii some editors put commas 
before and after “sweet” making of it, “Thus far for love, my love-suit, sweet, fulfill.” 
(136.4).  According to Burrow this creates an interrogative.  However when read as 
an adjective, sweet agrees with “love-suit” (136.4).  Line 5 introduces the pun on 
“Will.”  “Will, will fulfill the treasure of thy love,” (136.5).  According to Duncan-Jones  
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Will and will are read both as sexual desire and as a proper name “Will and in this 
way Will and will become associated in the mind because –ill in W-ill and –ill in w-ill is 
a repetitive sound.  In the same way that “treasure” (136.5) is used in Sonnet 20 so is 
it used in Sonnet 136 as a metaphor for the female or male genital organ rather than 
precious jewels as it is used in Sonnet 52, “Can bring him to his sweet up-locked 
treasure” (52.2).  The treasure of Sonnet 136 evokes the concrete sense of the word 
treasure in the same way as it does in Sonnet 20, ”Mine be thy love and thy love’s 
use their treasure.” (20.14).  The use of “treasure” again brings this Sonnet away 
from the sense of “soul” as the addressee’s spiritul nature or essence of the lady into 
the corporeal sense of the word as it is used in, “treasure of thy love” (136.5).  The 
woman to whom the poem is addressed is wanted or made use of as a thing or 
material object for her sexual purposes in the physical sense of the word rather than 
in the sense of being treasured or a person who is cherished and loved.  Here, the 
deeper question that seems to be asked in this poem, is love merely sexual appetite 
which has nothing whatever to do with the lofty sentiments of “soul”. The adverb 
“near” in, “If thy soul check thee that I come so near” seems to touch on a raw social 
nerve which is the hypocrisy and double standards in love that are unconsciously 
socially lived out like the play on words heard in the double-entendre of this poem. 
As afore discussed jokes raise the ugly the hypocritical to the surface. Willen and 
Reed quoted by Booth (1977) give two related glosses to the meaning of “soul” as 
speak the hidden the truth and come close to the heart of the matter (cf. Lyly, 
Gallathea 3.1.1). 
 
 
According to Booth line 6 of Sonnet 136 the pun on “ Ay” implies either the subject of 
verb “fill” as it is in “I”, “I fill it” or the confirmation of the verb in “Yes fill it”. (136.6). 
Burrow comments that the argument here is that your sexual organs are like a large 
exchequer or treasure chest in which “things” (136.7) is glossed as penis in the same 
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way that “thing” is glossed in Sonnet 20, “By adding one thing to my purpose nothing.” 
(20.14).  In Sonnet (135.12-14) the line, “Think all but one, and me in that one will” 
“one” converts in Sonnet (136.10) to, “I one must be”.  Line (136.8-12) appears on 
the one hand to request the lady to physically “hold” him (136.11) or regard him as of 
no worth or value, “For nothing hold me”(136.11).  This wish is contradicted in the 
second phrase of the same line, “so it please thee hold” (136.11).  Booth comments 
on, “this hectic display of bawdy puns” where “nothing implies view me as of no 
consequence or worthless or a non-thing so long as you hold, “That nothing me, a 
something sweet to thee.”  Here the play on the words “in the number” (136.9) and 
“nothing” escalates in tension until it reaches its climax in and becomes, “something 
sweet to thee.” or as an object that you consider “sweet” as opposed to valueless to 
you.   Alternatively it could be read as an object of value to you my sweet or an 
object, which in your evaluation is sweet rather than a nothing to you.   
 
 
The Poet plays on the sense of “nothing” which in essence means something in 
many of his plays as recorded by Crystal and Crystal (2002.298).  Crystal and 
Crystal list them in Tim (V1.86) “Nothing brings them all things,” Ham. (1.V.7) “Thou 
dost talk nothing to me.”  In King Lear Cordelia’s sense of “nothing” becomes the 
anguish of the whole play, “Can you make no use of nothing, nuncle” / Why no, boy, 
nothing can be made out of nothing” (Act 1. 4. 129-130).  There is a contradiction 
between the way “nothing” is interpreted in Sonnet 20 and the way it is used in 
Sonnet 136.  In Sonnet (20.12) the assertion is that nature’s addition or “thing” is 
useless for the Poet’s male purposes, “By adding one thing to my purpose nothing” 
whereas by contrast in Sonnet 136 “nothing” becomes, “something sweet to thee.”   
According to Booth, here the “thing” (20.12) that would be of no purpose becomes 
the “thing” that would be to his purpose “something.” 
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Through the course of this sonnet the attitude of the Poet changes to the addressee. 
This is typical of the emotional see-saw in the Kleinian concept of the paranoid-
depressive vacillation where fear for the integrity of the self alternates with fear for 
the wholeness of the object.  Initially the lady is referred to as a “blind soul” (136.2) 
and seen only in her sexual rather than her spiritual or personal value to the Poet, 
“Will will fulfill the treasure of thy love, / Ay fill it full with wills, and my will one,” 
(136.5-6).  This bravado or self-importance on the part of the Poet is then pricked 
into humility  and is followed by, “one being reckon’d none”. (136.8) or regard me of 
no consequence which in turn mutates into, “I one must be” (136.10).  This emotional 
vacillation continues until the Poet begins to view himself rather than the lady as 
“nothing” (1946. 124).lxix  This is different from the way the Poet thought of himself in 
Sonnet (135.14).  Here Will saw himself as the only one, “Think all but one, and me 
in that one Will.”  According to Burrow, by contrast in Sonnet 136, “one” (136.8) and 
“Will” count for nothing, “Then in the number let me pass untold,” (136.9) implies 
count me as nothing which suggests “therefore let me or my penis into [your vagina] 
surreptitiously without telling anyone or counting me as part of the tally. 
 
 
Jokes are the arbitrary connecting or linking usually by means of verbal association 
of two ideas, which in some way contrast with one another for instance “Will” and 
“will”.  Here lies the paradox of jokes.  Jokes appear to mean something, yet they are 
meaningless.  We attach sense to a remark that we know logically cannot have any 
meaning.  We discover truth in jokes, which lie contrary to our experience.  This is 
made apparent, “In things of great receipt with ease we prove, / Among a number 
one is reckon’d none.” (136.7-8).  At the manifest level of the poem Line 7 appears to 
mean what it says, in things of great importance or consequence which leaves the 
auditor waiting to hear what the truth is in this important insight only to be met by a 
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bathos that the importance on the face of it is meaningless, “one is reckon’d none” 
(136.8).  At the latent level of these two lines lies the sexual meaning, “in 
things”(136.7).  This “in things” refers to the female sexual organ whereas one thing 
or male sexual organ counts for nothing or is counted as a nonentity by comparison 
to the female organ.  Previously the female was regarded or her sexual organ was 
referred to as “thy blind soul”  (136.2) or mere body without soul.  Now by contrast 
the female sexual organ is regarded of “great receipt” or possibly of great sexual 
voracity as she was viewed in Sonnet 135.  According to Duncan-Jones this line 
returns to the metaphor of the sea in Sonnet (135.9) and connotes this line at the 
physical level as it refers to sexual organs of large capacity that are able receive or 
take in a great deal.  The interpretation offered by Duncan-Jones is contradicted by 
the gloss given by Booth.   
 
 
For Booth the line, “Among a number one is reckoned none.” is similar to the line in 
Sonnet 8 “Sings this to thee thou single wilt prove none.” (8.14).  This “none” implies 
unmarried and thus without an heir. In other words the line of descent will become 
extinct on your death or being single (one as the numeral 1) you will turn out to be 
nothing (zero or the numeral 0). This proverb of women stigmatized as “none” or 
meaning nothing socially appears to arise from Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1080 as 
quoted by Booth,  “And as she spake those words came somewhat neare him.. One 
is no number (36) mayds are nothing then..”(38).  The idea that woman is an 
imperfect creation only made perfect by marriage to a man remained a social 
convention from the time of Aristotle to post World War 1.  Thereafter the sense of 
woman being socially inferior to men began to change slowly in fits and starts in the 
Western World.  The verb “reckon’d” (136.8) suggests both apprehended and 
calculated.  According to Booth there appears to be an allusion to the ancient 
mathematical principle that one is no number or Tilley records “one as opposed to a 
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multitude” as proverbial (Tilley.054).  Booth singles out the graphic allusion of 
“nothing” to zero, as “0” in its circular shape appears to be similar in shape or a 
symbol for female vagina.  Nothing, also applies to the Poet’s sense of his own 
insignificance, “let me pass untold” by comparison to the amount of the Addressee’s 
lovers, which are so numerous that they cannot be counted, “let me pass untold.”   
 
 
Lines 9-10 introduce the contradiction between nothing and something. The motif of 
nothing is carried in the line “let me pass untold” whereas in line 10 this sense of 
nothing is reversed and becomes, “Though in thy store’s account I one must be,” 
(136.10).  The phonetic sound of “account” (136.10) echoes the acoustic form cunt 
and is similar to the way it is understood in Sonnet 20 by Booth, “A woman’s gentle 
heart but not acquainted” (20.3).  Here the similarity in sound is ‘cunt’ or slang for a 
woman’s vagina.  The noun “store” (136.10) devalues people making of them into 
possessions and evokes the motif of “nothing.”  As a possession, in “thy store’s 
account” emphasizes the corporeal nature of both men and women making of them, 
“nothing” (136.12) in the physical sense of the word rather than as “something” in the 
spiritual sense of both men and women.  This echoes the contradiction between the 
material and the spiritual raised in the oxymoron, “blind-soul.”  Notwithstanding the 
sense of personal worthlessness is lyrically inverted to something of value by the 
chiasmus in line 11, “For nothing hold me so it please thee hold, /  That nothing me, 
a something sweet to thee.” (136.11-12). 
 
 
The couplet of Sonnet 136 (13-14) is again formed by a chiasmus in the same way 
as it was in Sonnet 135 (13-14), “Make but my name thy love, and love that still,” 
(136.13).  The reversal of the structure of the line is repeated in line 14 of Sonnet 136, 
“And then thou lov’st me for my name is Will”.  Although it creates the same musical 
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effect as it did in Sonnet 135 in this sonnet it appears to tie up all the different senses 
of Will or will as they have been used in both sonnets.  In this way all the different 
senses of Will and will become subsumed within the name of the Poet Will.  An 
opposing interpretation is offered by Burrow.  Burrow views the use of the 
conjunction, “but” in, “Make but my name thy love, and love that still,” (136.13) as 
make only my name thy love.  On the other hand Booth does not emphasize the 
conjunction “but” in the same way as does Burrow but places his stress on the 
conjunctive adverb “for” (136.14) which serves to summaries or encapsulate all the 
different senses of Will or will.  According to Booth, this includes, since you love will, 
it follows that you must love me or find me loveable because of my will or my name is 
Will – I – am.  I am composed of will, I am personified by the name Will.  
 
 
According to Lionel Bailly (2009.118-122) lxx  the Lacanian term “jouissance” is 
enjoyment of a sensation for its own sake but ironically this pleasure is linked to the 
death drive.  Here there exists a border a place between pleasure and pain.  If the 
boundary between pleasure and pain is crossed it leads to a sense that pleasure will 
transform into pain.  This death drive is experienced as fear of castration or the 
humiliating experience of being deprived of power or the sexual experience of 
impotency. Freud elaborates this sense of symbolic castration in his paper On 
Narcissism: An Introduction, 
 
“But the revolt against the ‘censoring agency’ arises out of the subject’s desire 
to liberate himself from all those influences beginning with the parental one,..  
His conscience then confronts him in a regressive form as a hostile influence 
from without.” (1914. p.f.l. 11. 90-91) 
 
 At the manifest level of Sonnet 135 and Sonnet 136 is a sense of the Poet merely 
playing with the sound of his own name.  At the covert unconscious latent level is the 
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Poet playing with his name as a metaphor or symbol of his sexual organ or sexual 
self where Will becomes personified as his sexual identity.  At the concealed level of 
the sonnet the Poet seditiously attempts to seduce the addressee to whom the poem 
is written and excite her sexually.  The lady on hearing the words of the poem 
addressed to her is expected to become aware of the speaker’s excitement and as 
result to be become sexually excited in turn.  The latent aim is to expose.  In an 
attempt to seduce her, the Poet uses various sexually charged puns on will or Will in 
an endeavour to seduce her and to entice her to imagine the parts of the body of the 
Poet or the procedure in question and show her that he too is imagining her parts 
(Freud, S. 1905. p.f.l. 6. 141).  This view expressed by Freud is comparable to the 
latent play on the word Will and will in the two sonnets above.  The question 
becomes how does what is conceivably only in its symbolic aesthetic sense 
amusement between Poet and addressee transform into psychic pain.  
 
 
The Poet as discussed above appears to be saying in Sonnet 121 that people project 
onto others what they in themselves repudiate or disavow, “No, I am that I am and 
they that level / At my abuses, reckon up their own,” (121.9-10).  In relation to this 
perceived and predicted projection in Sonnet 135 and Sonnet 136 the Poet appears 
to use his wisdom in placing his erotic voice at the manifest level of the poem in the 
form of a joke where it is aesthetically and contemplated as pure enjoyment rather 
than being seen for what it is as the expression of a thought provoking idea about the 
nature of love.  Covertly on the other hand the question being asked in these sonnets 
is there a discrepancy between the idealized normative view of love and love as it is 
experienced and lived.  Alternatively is there as contradiction between the way love 
‘should be” and the way it is experienced by the Poet ‘it is not’.  This dissonance is 
apparent in sonnet 147 where love becomes a “fever longing still,” (147.1).  In 
Sonnet 148 the Poet questions his own capacity to love, “O how can love’s eye be 
 77 
true, / That is so vex’d with watching and with tears?” (148.9).  By contrast in Sonnet 
50 the Poet begins to see the love-object as a seductress who lures him away from 
his own known self, “Who taught thee how to make me love thee more, / The more I 
hear and see just cause of hate,” (50.9).  In Sonnet 151, the Poet appears to come to 
the conclusion that love is merely sexual appetite, 
 
For thou betraying me, I do betray 
My nobler part to my gross body’s treason, 
My soul doth tell my body that he may, 
Triumph in love, flesh stays no farther reason, 
But rising at thy name doth point out thee 
As his triumphant prize, proud of his pride, 
He is contented thy poor drudge to be 
To stand in thy affairs, fall by thy side. 
No want of conscience hold it that I call, 
Her love, for whose dear love I rise and fall.”   Sonnet 151. 5-18. 
 
 
In Sonnet 135 and Sonnet 136 what lies covert is the Poet’s attitude to women. “So 
thou being rich in will add to thy will add to thy will / One will of mine, to make thy 
large will more.” (135.11-12).  The manifest reading of the sonnet implies that women 
are sexually voracious.  Notwithstanding at the latent level the Poet associates 
women’s wombs with the unconscious meaning of the sea, “The sea all water, yet 
receives rain still,” (135.9) where it becomes a metaphor of life with all its 
regenerative powers and where the waves crashing against the shore and receding 
again become an unconscious symbol for sexual union and the life it produces.  In 
Sonnet 136 the female addressee is disparagingly represented as a “blind soul” 
(136.2), a body without a soul without insight without personality whose suitors in her 
mind count as non-entities “For nothing hold me” (136.11).   Alternatively her suitors 
or the number of the times she has intercourse are so numerous they to her become 
un-countable, “In things of great receipt with ease we prove / Among a number one is 
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reckoned none” (136.7-8) yet only a few lines later the Poet says of himself “That 
nothing me,’ (136.12).  In his wisdom the Poet returns the pejorative latent projection 
of sexual insatiability back onto his own self and in so doing re-presents the allusion 
to the sea of the woman as a bountiful life force in the same way as the Poet saw in 
nature, “And being frank she lends to those are free,” (4.4.) 
 
 
Civilization and higher education have a large influence in the development of 
repression and it is supposed that under such conditions the psychical organization 
undergoes an alteration as a result of which what was formerly felt as agreeable now 
seems unacceptable.  This sense of the unacceptable is formed by a fear of 
castration in its symbolic sense of humiliation or made to feel powerless or sexually 
impotent and the wish is rejected with all possible psychical force.  The task of dream 
formation is to overcome the inhibition from the censorship, which dominates daytime 
life and it is precisely this task, which is solved by jokes.  Jokes like dreams make 
use of the same unconscious processes.  The superficial difference between dreams 
and jokes is that the joker is fully aware.  He is not isolated from the external world 
and as such does not enjoy the same narcissism or egotism as does the dreamer nor 
do the processes involved in constructing a dream regress to perception and 
therefore a joke never becomes an hallucinatory experience as does the dream.  By 
contrast to dreams the capacity to make jokes develops at the stage of play that is 
during the stage of childhood.  Here pleasure is taken in the sound of words for their 
own sake more especially when words are placed in their incorrect contexts.  The 
anti-stasis or repetition of a word in contrary senses like the use of Will as a proper 
name and will as a verb or will as a common noun destabilizes formal syntax and in 
adults this childish pleasure is put back momentarily to the infantile type of thought 
activity. 
 
 79 
 
Both dreams and jokes make use of unconscious thought processes, but whereas 
the dream makes use of the day’s residues or thoughts that are left active in the 
preconscious which are used to construct a dream in the sleeper;  “jokes in the first 
person are formed by a preconscious thought being given over for a moment to 
unconscious revision and the outcome of this is at once grasped by conscious 
perception” (Freud, 1905. p.f.l. 6. 223).  Although jokes are similar to the making of a 
judgement or an objection the judgement in a joke is covert.  According to Freud,  
 
 “A joke has quite outstandingly the characteristic of being a notion that has 
occurred to us involuntarily” (1905.224).   
 
It is a sudden release of intellectual tension and then all of a sudden a joke is there.  
Jokes can be compared to analogy or allusion where allusion and analogy occur 
without being able to follow the preparatory thought.  Condensation in the dreamer 
compresses the qualities and images of different people together in order to create a 
symbolic theme, trope or dream scenario.  Conversely jokes plays on the multiple 
uses of the same word, similarity of sound and in this way a yield of pleasure is 
produced.  Displacement or metonymy is the same in both dreams and jokes.  
Displacement selects ideas, which are remote from the objectionable idea for 
instance in the sonnets above the objectionable idea is the male and female sexual 
organs.  Jokes relocate the objectionable idea onto innocuous ideas wishes or 
desires, “If thy soul check thee that I come so near” (136.1) and “Who ever hath her 
wish, thou hast thy Will,” (135.1).  In this way the offensive idea “will” as it represents 
the sexual organs of both sexes becomes quite capable of evading the censor by 
seemingly fitting the name of the Poet, “Will” yet at the same time remaining 
derivatives of the unpalatable idea will or sexual organ in the unconscious.  
Alternatively the idea of the female genital organ becomes represented by an 
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allusion to the sea, which consciously like the sea “receives rain still”((135.9), but 
unconsciously represents sexual intercourse.  However, under the pressure of the 
censor the primary process of dream work exploit any form of connection which can 
be formed by contiguity, similarity or similarity in sound.  In The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life (S.E. 6. 58)lxxi Freud writes, 
 
“A similarity of any sort between two elements of the unconscious material – a 
similarity between the things themselves or between their verbal presentation – 
is taken as an opportunity for creating a third, which is a composite or 
compromise idea.” 
 
The difference between dreams and jokes according to Freud (1905. p.f.l. 6. 230), 
 
“is that jokes usually respect the limits imposed on their employment in 
conscious thinking.  Furthermore jokes unlike dreams do not create 
compromises between the day’s residue or reality and unconscious thought 
processes.  Nor do they attempt to evade the censor.  They do however insist 
on maintaining play with words or with nonsense unaltered.  Nothing 
distinguishes jokes more clearly from all other psychical structures than the 
double-sidedness and duplicity in speech”,  
 
like “Will” and “wll.” 
 
 
This chapter has raised the question of the link between the signifier and signified 
and foregrounded the argument that there is no existential connection between the 
acoustic image or signifier and its signified or the interpreted word.  It is the 
looseness of this connection between the signifier and signified that allows the Poet 
of Shakespeare’s sonnets in his wisdom to exploit the flexibility between the signifier 
and its meaning and in this way the Poet evades the invective to his literary persona.  
The Poet does this by manifestly playing with his name and latently playing with his 
name in the form of an erotic rhetorical joke.  Jokes like dreams are part of 
unconscious reasoning or personalized psychic truth.  This was foregrounded by the 
Winnicottian paradigm of the True and False Self above.   This psychic truth in the 
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latent meaning of Sonnet 135 and Sonnet 136 destabilizes the conventional nature of 
the idealization of love and the denigratory attitude to women that prevailed at that 
time.  The Poet by playing with his name in the form of a witty play on words or pun 
displays his wisdom in evading the moral condemnation of the Super-ego which 
would have morally censured the sonnets if their sexual themes had been overtly 
exhibited. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Transience and Loss 
 
 
 
“When I consider everything that grows 
Holds in perfection but a little moment.” 
 
(Sonnet 15. 1-2) 
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Joseph Pequinqneylxxii nominates love as the subject of Shakespeare’s sonnets.  It 
could also be said that the theme of Shakespeare’s sonnets is beauty.  Although I 
agree that many of the themes of Shakespeare’s sonnets are about both beauty and 
love in this chapter I question the notion that the sonnets address love and beauty in 
an unambiguous certain or clear way.  Rather this chapter views the description of 
love and beauty presented by the Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets as equivocal and 
contradictory.  This is evident in Sonnet 17 and 18 where the beauty of the love 
object cannot in itself be described because it is found to be above comparison.  In 
Sonnet 17, “Who will believe my verse in time to come” (17.1) and “Shall I compare 
thee to a Summer’s day? / Thou art more lovely and more temperate:” (18.1-2).  
Here the Poet attempts to describe the beauty of the Loved-object but fails because 
the Loved-object is found to be matchless.  Notwithstanding, the sonnets do appear 
to tell a story of the proneness to decay of all that is beautiful and perfect and the 
Poet’s despondency and impotence in not being able to capture all the loveliness in 
both art and nature before it is destroyed by those instruments of ruin and 
annihilation like time, insincerity, nature, human rage and human and natural 
destruction.  
 
 
This chapter examines sonnets, 64, 91, 146, 30, 31 and 60.  Sonnet 64 and 91 are 
studied in terms of Freud’s theory On Transience. lxxiii
lxxiv
lxxvi
  In Sonnet 146, the Poet 
describes the contradiction between the false and artificial beauty of the body’s 
materialism as opposed to the soul’s truth and morality and this is explored in terms 
of Winnicott’s theory of the True and False self.    In Sonnet 30 and 31 the Poet 
describes the forlorn state of grieving for the lost object and this is understood 
through Freud’s theory of Mourning and Melancholia, lxxv and Analysis Terminable 
Interminable  where Freud understands that if the reason for the loss is not 
comprehended the loss is repeated.  In Sonnet 64, the Poet describes a pessimistic 
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determined view of the world where nature is transient love is futile and human 
endeavour pointless.  Sonnet 91 appears to accentuate the difference between the 
value of material possession or artifice as opposed to emotional love.  Unlike 
material possession love is experienced as ephemeral as it cannot be possessed 
because it is a feeling, which can only be preserved when held mutually.  This 
reliance on another renders love vulnerable to deception betrayal and transience.  In 
Sonnet 146, the Poet implies that beauty is distorted and misrepresented and 
portrayed as a false external signifier rather than internal veracity or truth.  In this 
sonnet the soul or internal truth is represented as perishing under the weight of the 
body’s materialistic avarice.  Sonnet 30 and 31 bring to the fore the difference 
between the Freudian concept of mourning and that of melancholia.  Whereas 
mourning is the reaction to loss where the world is experienced as becoming poorer, 
melancholia is a loss to the ego where the ego itself becomes impoverished.  The 
chapter concludes by appraising Sonnet 60.  In the couplet of this sonnet the Poet 
appears to accept loss and the transience of beauty with a sense of optimistic 
expectation that the beauty of his verse will survive the destruction by man and 
nature.  This suggests an awareness that his unique use of metaphor and metonymy 
will serve to empower his poetry with a personal truth and it is this that will 
immortalize his sonnets.  
 
 
Freud elaborates the notion of transience in an essay of the same name (1916.p.f.l. 
14. 291-294).lxxvii  Freud in the company of two artists on a walk in the summer is 
dismayed when one of the artists cannot enjoy the surrounding beauty because of 
the fleeting nature of beauty in itself.  Freud by contrast repudiates this sentiment 
writing that evanescence of beauty rather than terminating enjoyment heightens it, 
“As regards, the beauty of Nature, each time it is destroyed by winter it comes again 
next year so that in relation to the length of our lives it can in fact be regarded as 
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eternal” .  This sentiment is contrary to that expressed by the Poet in sonnets 64, 91, 
146, 30, 31 and 60 and in Sonnet 12. In these sonnets the Poet writes of the 
transience of concrete beauty, “And nothing ‘gainst Time’s scythe can make defence” 
(12.13).  Freud maintains a different view of concrete immortality, 
 
“A time may indeed come when pictures and statues which we admire 
today will crumble to dust or a race of men may follow us who no longer 
understand the works of our poets and thinkers, or a geological epoch 
may even arrive when all animate life upon the earth ceases; but since 
the value of this beauty and perfection is determined only by its 
significance for our own emotional lives, it has no need to survive us and 
is therefore independent of absolute duration” (1916.p.f.l. 14. 288).   
 
By contrast the Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets expresses the fragility of beauty, 
“How with this rage shall beauty hold a plea, / Whose action is no stronger than a 
flower?”  (64.3-4) and again in Sonnet 55, “When wasteful war shall Statues over-
turn, / And broils root out the work of masonry” (55.5-6).  The First World War broke 
out a year after this walk was taken. Freud writes (1916.p.f.l. 14 .289) that 
 
“It destroyed not only the beauty of the country-sides through which it 
passed and the works of art which it met with on its path but it also 
shattered our pride in the achievements of our civilization, our admiration 
for many philosophers and artists and our hopes of a final triumph over 
the differences between nations and races.”   
 
Ironically rather than feeling destroyed Freud found that, 
 
 “our affection for those nearest us and our pride in what is common to us 
have suddenly grown stronger” (1916.p.f.l. 14. 289-290).   
 
Freud concludes that this is because what was precious has proved not to be lasting 
and therefore mourning, “however painful it may be comes to a spontaneous end.”  
Freud deduced that mourning ends because the, “libido or capacity to love is once 
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again freed-up and able to replace the lost object by fresh ones equally loved or still 
more precious.”  Freud draws the essay to a close “We shall build up again all that 
war has destroyed, and perhaps on firmer ground and more lastingly than before.” 
 
 
By contrast to the optimism in the cycle of devastation and renewal expressed by 
Freud above each quatrain in sonnet 64 begins with an anaphora “When I have 
seen.”  The repetition of the phrase “When I have seen” colours the poem with a 
sense of pessimism, which is derived from the Poet’s past experience of acquisition 
and loss or creating and destroying.  This see-saw or swing from possession to 
deprivation serves to make the Poet anticipate loss, “But weep to have, that which it 
fears to lose” (64.14). Reversals pervade this sonnet, which emphasize the 
powerlessness of human endeavour against the dominance of nature.  This is 
evident in the Poet’s description of building up of “Lofty towers” (64.3) which through 
the use of oxymoron reverse to the opposite creating a sense of the impotence of 
human enterprise in  “down razed” (64.3), “outworn” (64.2) “buried age” (64.2).  The 
chiasmus derived from the reversal of the word order in the second phrase to the first 
appears to emphasize the cycle of fortune to loss and loss to fortune by mirroring it in 
the structure of the line of verse on the page, “Increasing store with loss, and loss 
with store”.  This serves to encapsulate the inverted sense of ownership, which over-
turns possession into deficit.  This have and have-not world is created by metaphors 
of competition between the land described as “shore”(64.6) and “firm soil”(64.7) 
which is undermined and sunk by the personification of the sea as ambitious 
“..hungry Ocean” (64.6) which the Poet describes as “gain advantage” (64.6) and the 
“wa’try main”(64.7).  These oxymoron serve to accentuate the sense of human 
defenselessness against the powerful omnipotent destroyer of Nature and Time.  
The paradox where loss is increased rather than diminished by store is carried into 
the third quatrain in “interchange of state” (64.9).  Here the “state itself” (64.9) is 
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“confounded, to decay,” (6410). Crystal and Crystallxxviii cite a line from KJ 1V.ii.29 
where “confounded” is glossed as “mar, corrupt and spoil.”  The lines from King John, 
emphasize, the sense of perfect beauty being destroyed by human envy rather than 
loss caused by natural, “decay” (64.9). “When workmen strive to do better than well / 
They do confound their skill in covetousness” KJ (1V.ii.29).   
 
 
The sense of spoil in the noun “Ruin” (64.11) suggests destruction of something that 
was previously whole and perfect before it was destroyed and wrecked through 
human negligence or envy in “ruinate.”  “Ruinate” makes use of the same vowel 
sounds as “Ruin” and this introduces a similar note of human neglect, which allows 
beauty to decay through lack of frugal management as in Sonnet 10, “Seeking that 
beauteous roof to ruinate”(10.7).  An alternative interpretation of “ruinate” is glossed 
as ruminate in the quarto reading and works more effectively as the verb ruminate 
appears to cohere with line 12-14 of Sonnet 64, “Ruin hath taught me thus to 
ruminate” as it appears to give credence to love’s impotence against the powerful 
destructive force in both man and nature which pervades this poem in the metaphor 
of “brass eternal” (64.4).  Brass is connected to slave as both are beaten; yet brass is 
a durable metal and this sense of resilience is contrasted to the vulnerability of a 
slave who is beaten into submission by an enraged master “mortal rage” (64.4).  
Ironically it is the slave like the brass that survives destruction “eternal slave” (64.4) 
which possibly lends credulity to man’s destructive brutality to others which survives 
and endures beyond the destruction of civilizations in “buried age” (64.2), or high 
buildings “down razed (64.3)”.   The sense of man’s rivalry and need to dominate is 
personified in nature in metaphors like, “hungry Ocean gain / Advantage on” (64.5-6) 
and “interchange of state” (64.9) which underscore the competition between the sea 
and land and the rivalry between man and man.  The sense of “interchange of 
state,“ creates a sense of insecurity of nameless identity where even states are 
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interchangeable and able to substitute one for the other as if each state had no fixed 
identity or individuality in time or place.   
 
 
In the face of this wanton neglect, devastation and decay the couplet, expresses the 
Poet’s feeling of impotence and helplessness in not being able to maintain love or 
beauty, “This thought is as a death which cannot choose / But weep to have, that 
which it fears to lose.”  The poem leaves the reader with a sense of fear of the 
transience of beauty and love and of possession, “weep to have” (64.14) because 
‘having’ by default entails loss.  In this sonnet the Poet describes a world that is 
determined.  Lack of choice to do other than repeat loss appears to underscore the 
transience of beauty and the futility of love and human endeavour. 
 
 
Sonnet 91 opens with what  sounds like a nursery rhyme or chant.  The anaphora or 
the repetition of a word or phrase at the beginning of successive lines is comparable 
to 3Henry (V1.2.5.26-38)lxxix repetitive phrase of “How many” and “So many” as he 
counts out the hours and minutes. Likewise, mock bravado in opens Sonnet 91.  The 
pronoun, “Some” (91.1) begins each line of the first quatrain. “Some glory” (91.1) and 
“Some in their wealth” (91.2) and “Some in their garments” (91.3) and finally “Some 
in their “Hawks and Hounds” (91.4).  The metaphors chosen by the Poet are 
concrete and can be visualized as the artifices or signifiers of what appears to “Some” 
(91.1-4) to be wealth.  The poet’s reference to  “Humour” (91.5) recalls the way it was 
used by the Poet in Sonnets 44 and 45 where the Poet refers to the imbalance of his 
four humours of blood phlegm, melancholy and choler in, “My life being made of four, 
with two alone, / Sinks down to death, oppress’d with melancholy.” (45.7-8).  
According to Colin Burrow writing in the Oxford Shakespeare (2002.562) lxxx the 
sense of “humour” (91.4) is broader in Sonnet 91, implying that each type of person 
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has their own peculiar pursuit according to that person’s disposition as determined by 
the relative balance of that person’s four humours.  In line 7 of Sonnet 91 the Poet 
differentiates himself from others by referring to these signifiers of wealth expressed 
in the first quatrain as, “But these particulars are not my measure” (91.7).  Booth 
writing in (1977. 297-298)lxxxi argues whether “better” in line (91.8) should rather be 
read as it is in the Quarto edition of Shakespeare’s sonnets as “bitter.”  The sense of 
“bitter” rather than “better” serves to elaborate the meaning of “my measure” in line 7 
creating a link with the speaker’s ageing and impending death as expressed in 
sonnets 63, 71, 73 and 81, “No longer mourn for me when I am dead, / From this vile 
world with vildest worms to dwell:” (71.1-2).   
 
 
Line 1-4 and line 9-11 of Sonnet 91 embody the outward signifiers of prosperity in the 
signifiers of prosperity in “high birth” “wealth” “garments cost” but line 10 belittles and 
diminishes these signifiers of affluence into the childish toys that are found in the 
nursery.  The repetition of the consonant of “Hawks” “horses” “hounds” (91.4) creates 
a sense of playthings by joining the repetitive hard consonant “h” to a simplistic end 
rhyme formed by “me” (91.9) and “be” (91.11).  This rhetorical strategy makes the 
contrast between “wealth” and “high birth” appear puerile when contrasted to the 
“wealth” (91.2) or significance of “Thy love” (91.9).  The movement from the pretense 
and the affectation of external tokens of love to internal sincerity in “Thy love” in line 
9 advances the question chosen in this chapter of the evanescence of love.  The 
irony in this sonnet is that the human emotion of love can be taken away, “All this 
away,” (91.14) leaving the Poet as worthless, “wretched make” (91.14) and humble 
deprived of “all men’s pride” more so than if the Poet had lost the external concrete 
signifiers of wealth as designated in the first quatrain as “birth”, “skill”, “wealth”, 
“body’s force”, “garments”, “hawks” “hounds” and “horse” which according to the Poet 
are not “my measure” (91.11).   
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The irony between external materialism and social flattery in comparison to the 
significance of internal wealth, and sincerity is clarified in Sonnet 91.  This deliberate 
deception is again highlighted in Sonnet 125, “Have I not seen dwellers on form and 
favour / Lose all.“ (125.5-6).  In Sonnet 91 the Poet appears to accentuate the 
difference between a material possession or artifice which in this sonnet is more 
durable than emotional love which in Sonnet 91 is depicted as brief, “..That thou 
mayst take, / All this away,” (91.13-14).  Unlike material possession love cannot be 
possessed because it is a feeling, which can only be conserved when held mutually.  
This reliance on another “But mutual render, “only me for thee.” (125.12), renders the 
Lover vulnerable and love open to deception and betrayal which makes love easily 
lost  “..a true soul / When most impeach’d, stands least in they control”  (125.12) and 
again in, “Or mine eyes seeing this, say this is not, / To put fair truth upon so foul a 
face,”(137.11-12).  Love and hate are two sides of the same coin and this same 
sense of the fallibility and shortcomings of love re-appears in Sonnet 90 and Sonnet 
92 and serves to underscore the fleeting and transient nature of having love and 
losing it that the Poet fears, “All this away.”  Sonnet 90 opens with the line, “Then 
hate me when thou wilt, if ever, now,” whereas Sonnet 92 highlights the transience of 
love, when it is dependent on an erratic or fickle lover, “I see, a better state to me 
belongs” / Than that, which on thy humour doth depend.” (92.7-8). 
 
 
Whereas some sonnets proffer earthly qualities of beauty and love, Sonnet 146 
appears to preference the endurance of moral richness over earthly avariciousness.  
According to Booth (1977. 501-517)lxxxii the poem’s theme cannot be set into terms of 
the alternatives of either as opposed to or but should be interpreted in terms of “both” 
“and” “is also.”  This sonnet is not understood in terms of religion but in terms of the 
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transience of false external signifiers of beauty as opposed to the durability of those 
qualities of internal authenticity as designated in the beauty of the Loved-object, “And 
him as for a map doth Nature store, / To show false Art what beauty was of yore.” 
(68.13-14). The soul according to Crystal and Crystal (2002.409) is the “driving force, 
or animating principle and can be viewed in the same light as it is in Sonnet 136, “If 
thy soul check thee that I come so near” (136.1) as “conscience”, “heart”, “inner 
being”.  According to Booth (1977. 501-517) the soul is depicted as the centre of the 
body in the same way that it is portrayed in King John (3.3.20-21), “Within this wall of 
flesh / There is a soul counts thee her creditor” and here once again in Hamlet, “I will 
find / Where truth is hid, though it were hid indeed / Within the centre” (Ham  
11.ii.156-158).   
 
 
In Sonnet 146 the conflict between the transience and loss of beauty is transferred 
from the external world to the conflict within the arena of the body and the soul.  In 
the first quatrain of Sonnet 146 the body’s false signifiers of external beauty “my 
sinful earth” (146.1) rather than the soul’s internal sincerity “within be fed” (146.13) is 
favoured.  The body in Sonnet 146 is portrayed as, “these rebel powers” (146.2) 
which lure the soul away from its proper “charge” (146.8) of authenticity which here is 
viewed as the enduring quality of veracity as it is portrayed in “Let me not to the 
marriage of true minds” (Sonnet 116.1).  According to Booth these “rebel powers” 
(146.2) pose a paradox, which symbolically represent the whole poem.  The “rebel 
powers” are the body, which besiege the soul allowing it to “pine” (146.3) and “suffer 
dearth”(146.3).  Booth forms a literal view of the body and views it as forming the 
outward shell of the soul, which serves as the soul’s protector “thy outward walls ” 
(146.4) and “mansion” (146.6).   
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The abject or “Poor soul” (146.1) on the other hand is represented as “pines within” 
(146.3) and suffering “dearth.”  The word “dearth” carries two opposing meanings.  
One is read as “scarcity” in the same way as it is depicted in Sonnet (14. 4), “Of 
plagues, of dearths, or season’s quality” whilst the other sense of “dearth” implies the 
opposite “costliness, high value” as it in Hamlet (V.ii.117) [Hamlet to Osrick, of 
Leartes], “His infusion of such dearth and rareness” (Crystal and Crystal 2002.116).  
The contrast between the body’s opulence and the soul’s languish is questioned by 
the Poet, “Why so large cost having so short a lease / Dost thou upon thy fading 
mansion spend?” (146.5-6). This sense of cost is understood in terms of previous 
sonnets.  The “large cost” can be viewed in terms of the material external signifiers of 
abundance and prosperity with which the body arrays itself, “… some in their body’s 
force” / Some in the garments though new-fangled ill” (91.2-3).  Alternatively “large 
cost” (146.5) can refer to the “large cost” to the soul of the body at the expense of the 
soul which is allowed to hunger and  “pine within” contrariwise to the portrayal of the 
body’s,  “Painting thy outwards walls so costly gay” (146.4).  What the Poet appears 
again to be implying in this sonnet is that beauty is again misrepresented and 
portrayed as an external signifier rather than internal veracity,  “But as the Marigold 
at the sun’s eye, / And in themselves their pride lies buried,” (25.6). 
 
 
The sense of outward cost, “outward walls so costly gay” and inward “dearth” is 
made to appear absurd in the light of the body’s short tenure on life, “Why so large 
cost, having so short a lease”. The term “lease” (146.5) is understood to be the span 
of life where life is not owned but merely on loan to the soul or rented out making 
both the soul and the body’s tenure on earth transient, “Shall worms inheritors of this 
excess / Eat up thy charge?” (146.7-8).  The paradox of large cost as opposed to 
short tenure suggests the Poet’s use of a similar paradox in line two of Sonnet 64, 
“The rich proud cost of outworn buried age” (64.2).  This irrationality underwrites the 
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sense of futility of bodily or earthly expense, on the body’s “fading mansion spend?”  
The misguided and foolish waste is again highlighted in line (146.8) only in this line 
the blame and guilt is reversed and now falls to the soul who this time is rebuked for 
neglecting its rightful “charge” or responsibility, which here is viewed as virtue and 
morality and which supersedes the bodies greed of earthly signifiers of wealth.  This 
laxity on the part of the soul permits the body to embellish itself at the expense of the 
soul’s rightful “charge” or responsibility, which is “within be fed”(146.13).  According 
to Colin Burrows (2002.672) the implied loss reverses the predatory relationship, with 
which the poem started: now the body is placed subordinate to the soul. This 
reversal of roles underscores the inter-dependence of the soul and body.  
 
 
The rhetorical question, “Is this thy body’s end?” opens the question of whether “thy.. 
end?” (146.9) is addressed to the soul “thy end” or the body.  The partial phrase “thy 
end” (146. 9) introduces the inter-dependence of body and soul because the soul is 
within the body and the soul by default is implicated in the wasted time and worthless 
material, “hours of dross” that is consumed by the body.  The alternative offered to 
the soul is “Buy terms divine” which according to Burrows finds an echo of the biblical, 
“lay up treasure for yourself in heaven, where neither the moth nor canker corrupteth 
and where thieves neither dig nor steal.”  The use of the verb “Buy” implies purchase 
and this poses a conundrum as to the values embodied in this poem as “Buy” 
(146.12) serves to equate earthly acquisitions with the procurement of spiritual or 
non-physical part of the person which holds belief as if they were both the same.  
Neither is earned through hard work and both can be purchased.  The choice offered 
to the soul by the Poet,  “Within be fed, without be rich no more:” (146.12) appears to 
be either that the soul continues to live off “thy servant’s” (146.10) or thy body’s “loss” 
which will only “aggravate” (146.11) and add to its weight and magnify or increase its 
load, “thy store” (146.11) or “burden” (Crystal and Crystal 2002.12).  Or, alternatively 
 96 
the soul by contrast to the body’s materialistic avarice can choose to, “Within be fed,” 
on abstract ethical and moral values. 
 
 
The couplet is one of profound depression “So shalt thou feed on death, that feeds 
on men.”  This line can be viewed as returning to the meaning imbued in line 14 of 
Sonnet 1 where the Narcissist’s “glutton” (1.13) “To eat the world’s due, by the grave 
and thee” (1.14) ironically serves to destroy the beauty of love-object rather 
immortalizing it through progeny.  The tacit understanding of line 14 of Sonnet 146, 
“So shalt thou feed on death, that feeds on men,” is glossed as a life where the sole 
meaning is derived from external signifiers of wealth, “Then soul live thou upon thy 
servant’s loss,” (146.11).  This type of life according to the Poet is experienced as 
already dead, or a life without meaning where “ death that feeds on men,” (146.14).  
This life mutates from a life of significance where the soul is mindful of its “charge” 
into a life without inner importance or value, “Shall worms inheritors of this excess / 
Eat up thy charge ?” (146.7-8).   Death feeds on such a life as such a life life is 
already dead or without vitality or a “soul” whilst living.  This view is corroborated in 
the sense of “death once dead” (146.14).  This sense of a double-death or an inner 
and an outer, physical or external death suggests the first quatrain where the body is 
privileged over the soul “pine” .  This materialism over spiritualism creates a sense of 
spiritual deadness or what Winnicott refers to as “not feeling real” (Winnicott, D.W. 
1963. 179-193)lxxxiii.   
 
 
The body is described as the “rebel” and as “sinful earth,” that entices the soul away 
from its proper function “thy charge?”   Here virtue is viewed as the soul’s charge in, 
“Within be fed.”  The body’s, “Painting thy walls so costly gay” is death to the soul 
and this feeling of outside “gay” and inner poverty is re-visited in Sonnet (66. 3), “And 
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needy Nothing trimmed in jollity,”.  The oxymoron “needy nothing” implies the irony 
that although destitute poverty requires no succor or “nothing” (66.3). The 
causticness of the oxymoron “needy nothing”(66.3) is further intensified when set into 
the line “trimmed in jollity.”  This ironically portrays inner poverty as a “beggar born” 
(66.2) camouflaged by external ornamentation.  This same sense of external gay and 
internal dearth is repeated in Sonnet 146 where it is glossed as similar to that of the 
deception of the inner starving soul within the outer luxuriously adorned body.  This 
sham creates a sense of inner-deadness to the experience of being alive,  “And 
death once dead,” appears here to signify that of not being animated or being 
emotionally and spiritually dead while physically living.  Once the body is actually 
dead, “there’s no more dying then.” (146.14) as the body and the soul are portrayed 
in Sonnet 146 as inter-dependent; the soul needs the body in order to exist within; 
whilst the body needs the soul “thy charge” (146.8) to master it, “Shall worms 
inheritors of this excess / Eat up thy charge ? / Is this thy body’s end?” 
 
 
According to Winnicott (1963.184) lxxxiv
lxxxv
 “communication belonging to the false self 
does not feel real because it is detached or split-off from the true self or split off from 
the “soul” (146.1) and therefore there is no communication with “subjective objects” 
that is those subjective feelings thoughts and ideas which belong to the True Self.  
Not feeling real, “is not a true communication because it does not involve the core of 
the self, that which could be called the “true self” (1963.184).  Winnicott writing in 
Playing and Reality (1971. 76-100)   notes, “it is creative apperception more than 
anything else that makes the individual feel that life is worth living.”  For Winnicott 
creative apperception implies an infant who develops from the centre of gravity and 
is therefore lodged in the kernel of his own sense of self. This implies that the infant’s 
perception of reality is inflected by subjectivity; it is subjectively significant.  This 
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according to Winnicott lends meaning to life and makes living worthwhile (1971. 
65)lxxxvi. 
 
 
In Sonnet 30 the Poet apparently mourns the loss of ideals, “lack of many a thing I 
sought” (30.3) and the loss of “precious friends” (30.6).  The question becomes are 
Sonnets 30 and 31 a description of mourning or melancholia or depression because 
in the poem the lost-loved objects of Sonnet 30 appear not to be permanently lost 
because the old lost love is merely transferred to a new object in Sonnet 31, “Their 
images I lov’d, I view in thee,” (31.13).  Freud in his lecture Mourning and 
Melancholia (1917. p.f.l. 11.245-269)lxxxvii writes that mourning for a lost object is a 
natural condition.  Mourning can be for the loss of a loved person, one’s country, 
one’s liberty, or an ideal.  Freud differentiates the work of mourning from melancholia 
in  
“that mourning is the reaction to the loss of a loved object, which comes to a 
spontaneous end because the libido or capacity to love is once again freed-up 
and fresh objects equally loved or still more precious can replace the lost 
object.”   
 
By contrast, melancholia is a loss to the ego of a more ideal kind.  In melancholia this 
takes the form of a narcissistic injury as a result of being jilted or a loss of an ideal.  
What has been lost in mourning is known and therefore conscious, but in 
melancholia what has been lost is unconscious or unknown.  However the same 
work of mourning or grieving over the lost object is common to them both, 
  
“Then can I grieve at grievances foregone,   
And heavily from woe to woe tell o’er  
The sad account of fore-bemoaned moan” (Sonnet 30.9-11) 
 
 By contrast to mourning the work of grieving absorbs the melancholic entirely as it 
lowers his self-regard, which makes him feel that his ego or sense of self has been 
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impoverished.  In melancholia, the ego itself has become empty and suffers 
impoverishment.  Conversely in mourning it is the world that has become poorer. 
 
 
Booth (1977.181.183), Duncan-Jones(1997.170) lxxxviii
lxxxix
 and Burrow (2002.440) all 
gloss “sessions” in line one of Sonnet 30 as referring to the periodic sittings of judges 
in a law court.  The reference to judges in law courts is pertinent to this poem 
because it suggests the Poet is ruminating on his current experience of loss in the 
light of his past experience of loss.  Freud (1923) viewed the super-ego’s role in 
relation to the ego as that of a judge or a censor.  In this way conscience, self-
observation and the formation of ideals become part of the function of the Super-ego.  
In the second line of Sonnet 30 the Poet makes use of the verb “summon up.”  This 
is germane as the essence of memory is that it is not currently available but can only 
be summoned up or evoked by a loss in current life that arouses the memory of the 
lost object of the same or similar ilk of the past.  The two losses although different 
feel the same and are experienced in the same way, “I summon up remembrance of 
things past,”(30.2).  Freud (1895.7)  writes “Hysterics suffer mainly from 
reminiscences” and this sense of unconscious recollection is made tangible in the 
verb  “Summon up” as it explains the preoccupation of the hysteric with the signifiers 
of the unconscious or what Freud termed “Vorstellung” or the “Ideational 
Representative”xc.   
 
 
The ideational representative differs from a linguistic representation in that a 
linguistic representation is conscious whereas an ideational representative like a 
signifier or the manifest dream or work of art is an unconscious symbol and requires 
understanding to be consciously known.  Vorstellung  or ideational representative 
involves all those memories feelings and ideas that originally emanated from the 
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object within the external world, which the mourner unconsciously represents to 
himself within the internal world.  It is these unconscious thing presentations, which 
are past but are projected in current life on to the object in the present, which makes 
the past and present object feel the same and be experienced in the same manner.  
The paradox of “old woes new wail” epitomizes the sense of the equation of the past 
in the present as for the mourner, they are both felt as the same loss, “old woes new 
wail my dear time’s waste:” (30.4).   
 
 
In line 6, the loss is experienced as  “lack” (30.3) of “precious friends”.  Here, the 
sense of  “lack” is experienced as a narcissistic blow or hole in the Poet’s own sense 
of well-being caused by the loss of expectation or loss of ideals, “the lack of many a 
thing I sought.”  However in line 6 of Sonnet 30 the loss becomes the loss of 
“precious friends.”  This loss of “precious friends” rather than causing a hole in the 
ego as it does in melancholia “the lack of many a thing I sought,” this loss is caused 
by missing people or “precious friends.”  The loss of precious friends becomes a hole 
in the world where the loved-object is missing whereas the loss of ideals causes a 
hole in the self.  In this sonnet then, the Poet in the first 8 lines of the sonnet 
describes a repetitive loss of two types.  One is of melancholia where the “lack” is of 
the loss of expectation and the loss is within him; the other reveals the work of 
mourning for a lost love object, which is repeatedly mourned in “death’s dateless 
night.”  The sense of time does not exist in the unconscious as timelessness 
characterize the unconscious which makes different times merge and coexist in one 
dream or poem, “dateless.” 
 
 
The adjective “dear” refers to the cost of the wasted time rather than  “dear” or 
cherished “time” (30.4).  The parenthesis around “unus’d to flow” (30.5) in preference 
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to being an after-thought or a digression serves to accentuate that the Poet does not 
consciously allow himself to squander time in lost expectation because of the “dear” 
(30.4) or expense of the cost of time.  The visual metaphor, “drown” (30.5) creates a 
picture of a gush of tears from an eye that is “(unus’d to flow)” drowning in the heavy 
flow of its own tears.  The sense of “drown an eye” followed by “unus’d to flow” which 
is set in parenthesis, “(unus’d to flow)” seems to suggest interpolating the reason for 
“flow” which because of the parenthesis makes the reason understood by the reader 
as one of self-conscious embarrassment, (unus’d to flow). This self-consciousness 
on the part of the Poet reinforces the melancholic’s sense of self-criticism or self-
recrimination that the Poet appears to express that he only has himself to blame for 
the loss, “And moan th’expense of many a vanished sight.” (30.8).  It is his own self-
pity, which causes his eye to drown in its own tears.  The choice of the verb “hid” 
serves to qualify the sense that the friends cannot be found, they are “hid” or 
obscured from sight in daylight but “hid’ in “death’s dateless night.”  The sense of 
“dateless” reinforces the sense of repetition, in “dateless” or no fixed time, which is 
strengthened by the effect of the alliteration in “death’s dateless night”.  The 
alliteration of the consonant “d” in “dateless” and “death” serves to emphasize the 
repetitive nature of the emotional rather than the actual experience of “death” which if 
it were an actual “death” it would occur only once and not be repeated.  This sense of 
recurrence is repeated in the end rhyme “night”, which although opposite rhymes 
with “sight” (30.8). This serves to enhance the rhetorical technique of alliteration and 
assonance draws these two rhymed opposites together making of them the same 
repetitive “vanished sight” (30.8).  The sight that within the night vanishes in day-light 
“mourn the loss” is repeated in the dark of the following night which underscores the 
sense that the loss is not an actual loss of a friend but loss through repetitive betrayal, 
rejection or desertion of not one friend or ideal but many.  Line 6 portrays the body as 
preoccupied by loss. 
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As aforesaid it is this recurrence of loss to the ego, which transforms the work of 
mourning into a melancholia as described by Freud (1917) above.  The juxtaposition 
of night and death in Sonnet 30 evokes Sonnet 73 “Death’s second self that seals up 
all in rest.” (73.8).  Both sonnets suggest the night-dream when the awareness of the 
day and reality-testing is eliminated.  Mourning is differentiated from melancholia 
because in mourning daylight and “reality testing” reveal that the loved-object no 
longer exists, “objects shall have been lost which once brought real satisfaction.” 
(1925. p.f.l. 11. 440).   Freud  writing in Mourning and Melancholia writes that, 
 
the work of mourning differs from that of melancholia because it shows 
that the loved-object no longer exists.  “Reality demands that all libido 
should be withdrawn from the love object.” 
 
 
In the first 8 lines the Poet describes his loss.  In line 9 the mood of the sonnet 
changes with the conjunctive adverb, “Then” (30.9).  “Then” introduces the reader to 
the Poet’s practical experience of the loss.  The Poet explains the repetitive memory 
of lost expectation in, “many things I sought” (146.3) and the “precious friends” (30.6) 
that return as if in a dream at night. “Then can I grieve at grievances foregone,” 
(30.9.). ”Foregone” according to Crystal and Crystal (2002.183) 146.9) signifies 
carried out in the past and “..tell, o’re / “The sad account of fore-bemoaned 
moan”(146. 10-11). “Fore-bemoaned” again according to Crystal and Crystal 
(2002.183) is interpreted as previously lamented.   The Poet’s sense of, “new pay as 
if not paid before” (30.12) re-iterates the repetitive theme of this sonnet in 
“remembrance of things past” which are repeated in the present “And weep afresh 
love’s long since cancell’d woe.” Freud (1917) comments that in melancholia  
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“Reality demands that all libido should be withdrawn from the love-object.  
This demand of reality results in opposition from the Ego and this 
opposition takes the form of a renewed clinging to the object.”  The Ego 
prolongs the process of mourning by constantly thinking about the loss.  
“Each single one of the memories and expectation in which the libido is 
bound to the object is brought up and hyper-cathected” (Freud 1917).  
 
Freud’s words above can be applied to an interpretation of the Poet’s pre-occupation 
with loss, which is expressed as, “Which I new pay as if not paid before” (30.12) “And 
weep afresh love’s long since cancelled woe,” (30.8).  
 
 
The couplet of Sonnet 29 creates the same reversion to the opposite to the first three 
quatrains of the sonnet as it does in Sonnet 30.  This reversal to the opposite acts as 
form of negation, which can be glossed as cancelling the envy out of sonnet 29 or 
withdrawing the mourning of Sonnet 30.  The envy expressed in Sonnet 29 is evident 
in line 4, “Wishing me like to one more rich in hope, / Featur’d like him, like him with 
friends possess’d,” (29.5-6).  This envy is negated in the couplet of Sonnet 29, “For 
thy sweet love rememb’red such wealth brings, / That then I scorn to change my 
state with Kings.“(29.13-14).  In Sonnet 30 the same rhetorical maneuver prevails, 
“But if the while I think on thee (dear friend) / All losses are restor’d, and sorrows 
end.” (30.13-14). The negation of the envy in Sonnet 29 and the negation of 
mourning of Sonnet 30 emphasizes that the envy or mourning of the previous night is 
annulled and it is for this reason that it has not been understood or mourned and let 
go of that the sense of loss or envy persists and returns the following night.  A 
different interpretation emphasizes the ambiguity of the last line of Sonnet 30.  The 
words “dear friend” (30.13) are set in parenthesis.  The question raised is does this 
parenthesis mark a departure from the topic of mourning, or is it an after-thought or a 
satirical aside which points to a latent resentment on the part of the Poet towards the 
lost friend for forsaking him. 
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 On the one hand there is the wish is to mourn the loss of the loved-object and on the 
other hand the wish is the opposite; that the loved-object was still present in the life 
of the Poet.  This sense of loss is further complicated by the resentment the Poet 
feels towards the lost loved-object in line 12, “Which I new pay as if not paid before.”  
This suggests the Poet’s negative feelings of resentment or hostility towards the 
loved-object because the object has abandoned him.  The above instances of mixed 
emotions makes of the mourning in Sonnet 30, a melancholia where the experience 
of loss rather than the actual loss is repeated and the Poet unconsciously becomes 
pre-occupied by loss and in so doing prevents himself from moving on from the past 
loss, “Then can I drown an eye (unus’d to flow).”  
 
 
Freud in Analysis Terminable Interminable writes, “Objects that are lost cannot be 
replaced”xci.   In the light of this assertion by Freud, Sonnet 31 could be thought of as 
a defence against loss as what appears to have been lost in Sonnet 30 is not lost but 
merely replaced by transferring the same love towards the lost object onto a new 
different object, which replaces the old lost objects of Sonnet 30, 
  
“Thy bosom is endeared with all hearts,   
Which I by lacking have supposed dead,  
And there reigns Love and all Love’s loving parts,  
And all those friends which I thought buried. ( 31. 1-4). 
 
 
In quatrain 2 of Sonnet 31 the Poet appears to express a sense of resentment at the 
time spent in the “holy and obsequious tear” of a mourner who pays-out “interest” or 
spends time in a proper regard in the ritual for the dead.  The time spent seems to 
imply that the dead demand a penance, “interest of the dead” (31.7).  This sense of 
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advantage gained by the dead over the living is expressed in the sense of servile 
duty that is undertaken by the mourner, “holy and obsequious tear” (31.4). 
Alternatively “interest” or a valid claim on the Poet (Crystal and Crystal 2002.243) 
can signify that even though the Poet has turned his attention away from the buried 
loves of Sonnet 30 he has only managed to transfer the same old love onto a new 
object, “But things remov’d that hidden in thee lie” (31.8) and further in, “Thou art the 
grave where buried love doth live”.  In this way the old-claim of the old Loved-object 
remains operative in the new object.  The loved-objects rather than being hidden in 
“death’s dateless night” as they were in Sonnet 30 now are “hidden” (31.8) in “thee” 
or in the “bosom” of a new loved-object. 
 
 
There is a shift in the mood of the poem from one of resentment expressed in 
quatrain two to that of triumph over the dead, “Hung with the trophies” (31.9) in 
quatrain three.  Now, the new-loved object becomes the “grave where buried love 
doth live” (31.9).  The paradox of “buried love” doth “live” points to the irrationality of 
mourning the loss of the living.  This illogicality is inherent in melancholia where the 
dead are not lost but resurrected in a new emotionally alive object.  This same 
sentiment is expressed in Sonnet 68 line 8, “To live a second life on second head,” 
(68.8).  Line 10 of Sonnet 31 is ambiguous.  The question becomes do the tokens of 
victory or “trophies” (31.10) belong to the “lover’s gone,” (31.10) or to the Poet?  All 
“their parts” (31.11) appear to be metonymically displaced and condensed and 
transferred onto the new Love-object, “thee did give,” (31.9-10).  The metonymic 
substitution of parts for the whole emphasizes the paranoid narcissistic loss to the 
Poet’s own ego “parts of me” (31.11) rather than the depressive anxiety of fear or 
concern for the loss of the whole loved-object.  Freud’s paper On Transference xcii is 
applied to the understanding of this metonymic displacement of part of the object  for 
the whole object in Sonnet 31.  What has been transferred is not the memory of the 
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whole past Loved-object, rather it is “but all their parts of me.”  These parts referred 
to by the Poet and made sense of through Freud’s theory  On Transference (S.E. 
V11.116) are “new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and phantasies which are 
aroused and made  conscious” in the new relationship… but they have this 
peculiarity, which is characteristic of their species, that they replace some earlier 
person by the person” of the new loved-object.”  
 
 
In this way, “all hearts, / Which I by lacking have supposed dead….But things 
remov’d that hidden in thee lie.” (31.1-2 and 31.8), becomes credible.  Parts of the 
new loved-object in the day’s residues of current life establish a connection with parts 
of the old lost love object of past life in the preconscious.  Parts of the old love 
metonymically transfer their cathexis or emotional intensity onto the new object, 
making the two different objects feel the same and be experienced in the same way 
and in this way the lost object is emotionally replaced.                   
 
 
There is a new shift in the couplet of the poem from the fear of the loss to the Poet’s 
own Ego outlined in the first three quatrains of Sonnet 31 to the concern that the 
object will be lost in the couplet of Sonnet 31.  The condensation of “Their Images” 
implies, “For Precious friends hid in death’s dateless night,” which are re-found or re-
duplicated “in thee” (31.13) and are viewed by the Poet as neither new nor old, “And 
thou (all they)” (31.14).  The quarto’s setting of “(all they)” in parenthesis highlights 
that condensation should not be looked on as a summary or aggregate of parts of the 
old love object which are subsumed within the new loved-object “I view in thee,” but 
each part of the old loved object represents an identified element or part of the lost 
object in the unconscious associative chain.  Each element or “(all they)” where “all” 
is an identified part of the lost love object or lost objects in relation to the Poet, “Who 
 107 
all their parts of me to thee did give.”  Each part has its own meaning and cannot be 
submerged or subsumed within a different person.  The old love object retains “parts”  
its identity in the new object as “interest of the dead,”(31.2). 
 
 
Sonnet 31 by contrast to Sonnet 30 introduces a note of what Klein called depressive 
anxiety (1935. 262-290). xciii  This traces a change in the predominant anxiety from 
dread of persecution or fear of loss to the ego to fear that hate or resentment by the 
Ego towards the lost object or in this instance the Poet in Sonnet 31 to past Loved-
object  “As interest of the dead, which now appear, / But things remov’d that hidden 
in thee lie”  has done actual harm to the loved object and that the object has been 
lost and the object has gone.  The emotion shifts in each quatrain of sonnet 31.  The 
first quatrain evokes a sense of melancholy “And all those friends which I thought 
buried”, whilst the second quatrain stirs with a note of resentment towards the lost 
loved-objects “Interest of the dead” and “stol’n from mine eye.”  The third quatrain 
proclaims a note of triumph in, “trophies of my lover’s gone” or triumph over the dead 
whereas the Poet turns his attention back to the past love objects in “(all they)” in the 
couplet (31.14). 
 
 
Sonnet 31 brings about an actualization of the past in the present.  In Analysis 
Terminable and Interminable Freud writes that the, 
  
“Compulsion to repeat” is a process arising in the unconscious.  The 
subject deliberately places himself in a distressing situation, thereby 
repeating an old experience but he does not recall this prototype on the 
contrary he has the strong impression that the situation is fully 
determined by the circumstances of the moment”.   
 
Freud continues, that, 
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“A thing which has not been understood inevitably re-appears like an un-
laid ghost. It cannot rest until the mystery has been solved and the spell 
is broken.”  (1937. S.E. XX111. 79-80). 
 
Sonnet 30 and 31 appear to re-enact this compulsion to repeat “And weep afresh 
love’s long since cancell’d woe, / And moan th’expense of many a vanish’d sight.”  
The repetitive lost relationship is transferred onto a new object because the reason 
for the loss has not been understood. 
 
 
In Sonnet 60 the Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets makes use of the unconscious 
primary processes of condensation and displacement or metaphor and metonymy to 
create a sense of perpetual loss by mimicking through the structure of his verse the 
rhythms of the coming-in and going-out of the sea-tides.  The tides are 
metonymically linked to the mechanical ticking of time and this ticking away of time is 
likened to the processes of human life and death, which like the sea and the 
mechanisms of clock tick “all forwards do contend.” (60.4) yet, ironically ebb life away. 
The analogical reasoning which links the similarities between the different objects of 
the sea and time to life and death like metaphor enlarges the reader’s 
comprehension of both this sonnet and of their own lives. 
 
 
Line one of Sonnet 60 begins with a simile.  “Like as” (60.1). The trochee in line1 
formed by the adverb “towards” momentarily holds the steady rhythm of iambic 
pentameter of the first line “make towards the pebbled shore,” (60.1).  This temporary 
freezing of the movement of the verse imitates the visual metaphor of the freezing of 
the wave at its height before it breaks and rolls “towards” (60.1) the shore.  The 
metaphor of birth and death is taken up in line 2 of Sonnet 60, “So do our minutes 
hasten to their end.”  The phrase “hasten to their end” captures not only the rhythm 
of the wave as it reduces in size from its height but it accurately represents time as 
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the seconds tick away into “minutes” (60.2).   A similar sense of the high and low in 
life’s journey is echoed in Sonnet 7.  Here it is the sun which is likened to a man at 
the height of his power “from highmost pitch” (7.9) who like the sun descends “to his 
low tract” (7.12) and is “outgoing” (7.13) in his ”noon”(7.13).  In Sonnet 60, the 
progression of human life is seen to be like the wave which with the increasing speed 
“hasten to their end” (60.2) or death.  By contrast to Booth (1977.239) who writes that 
“waves do not exchange places with one another”, here, a deeper meaning is sought 
which is more in line with Winnicott in The Location of Cultural Experience 
(1971.112)xciv.  Winnicott writes  
 
“When I first became a Freudian I knew what it meant.  The sea and the 
shore represented endless intercourse between man and woman, and 
the child emerged from this union to have a brief moment” 
[“towards” ](60.1) “before becoming in turn adult or parent and then old-
age and death.”   
 
 
This life-cycle and woman’s receptive place in it is referred to in chapter 3 in relation 
to the sea which like a woman’s womb receives, “The sea all water, yet receives rain 
still” (135.9). 
 
 
Ironically the sonnet is numbered “60” almost as if it were a representation of the 60 
minutes within the hour or the 60 seconds within a minute.  Each wave “in sequent 
toil” (60.4) like each minute can never be re-lived, re-captured or re-taken, “And time 
that gave, doth now his gift confound.” (60.8). The use of “sequent” according to 
Crystal and Crystal (2002.392) creates a sense of following or attendant on the other 
which is apt if the meaning of human action like the wave is determined by the action 
or wave that proceeded it.   
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Birth or “nativity” with its sense of opportunity is metaphorically compared to the great 
expanse of the sea  “once in the main of main of light,” (60.5).  This sense of this 
supremacy. is comparable to the way it is figured in Sonnet (80.8), “But since your 
worth (wide as the Ocean is).”  The representation of the infant pictured crawling or 
going at slow pace “all forwards” as it “Crawls to maturity” (60.6) is apposite because 
the picture fuses or condenses the infant’s movement with time which is experienced 
as going slowly in youth “Crawls” before the infant’s journey is thwarted by “eclipses” 
(60.7).  In Sonnet (107.5) “eclipse” is figuratively used to represent both the woman’s 
menstrual cycle through the month and the Moon’s passage through the month, 
which in this sonnet represents peace, “The mortall Moone hath her eclipfe indur’de” 
(107.8).  By contrast “eclipses” as it is used in Sonnet 60 are “crooked” which 
according to Crystal and Crystal (2002.108) signifies a malignant, perverse 
astronomical influence which thwarts man’s accomplishment “being crowned” (60.6) 
and frustrates man’s attempt at achievement “gainst his glory fight” (60.7). 
 
 
Quatrain three personifies “Time” (60.9) as it does in Sonnet 19 “Devouring time” 
(19.1) as the destroyer, which in Sonnet 60 metaphorically stabs at the healthy glow 
in the “flourish” (60.9) of youth’s brow.  “Transfix” (60.9) adds a note of shock to the 
violence and destruction of youth.   “Time” is transformed from a benign presence as 
depicted in the first quatrain, “In Sequent toil all forwards do contend” to 
metaphorically wounding youth immobilizing it in the verb “Transfix” or piercing it as it 
“delves’ (60.10) or digs the wrinkles which like corresponding worry lines “parallels” 
(60.10) form in beauty’s brow.  “Time” is once again personified as gluttonous “Feeds 
on the rarities of nature’s truth.” (60.11). Here “rarities” according to Crystal and 
Crystal (2002.362) signifies exceptional qualities.  In line 11 “Time” is metaphorically 
represented almost as if it were nourishing itself on youth rather than enabling youth 
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as it does in line 4 to go “ all forwards”  towards “maturity” in “being crowned.”  By 
line twelve, “Time” (60.9) has metamorphosed into a “scythe” (60.9), which brutally 
cuts down life in “mow.” (60.12).   
 
 
The couplet by contrast to the metaphors of despair, helplessness, transience and 
loss figured in the first three quatrains of Sonnet 60, offers the very human quality of 
“hope” (60.13).  Here, “hope” is coupled with the Poet’s verse.  This sense of “hope” 
is given special importance in the conjunctive adverb “And Yet” in spite of everything, 
“my verse shall stand” (60.13).  The pronoun “thy” is left indefinite for the auditor to 
project his or her own sense of praise into.  The sense of “And Yet” almost appears 
to give a sense of the Poet’s acceptance rather than negation of both transience and  
Loss.  The Poet appears to be saying in this sonnet that in spite of the brevity, 
fragility, deceit, destruction and violence to love and beauty, “my verse shall stand / 
Praising thy worth, despite his cruel hand. “ (60.13-14). 
 
 
Freud understood that consciousness or awareness was inextricably bound up with 
language.  Making the unconscious conscious was in his Meta-psychological papers 
presented as the difference between thing presentation and word presentation 
(Freud, 1923).  Thing presentations or the un-named known or un-comprehended 
characterize the unconscious system whereas word presentations characterize the 
system conscious.  In other words, where signifier is no longer unconscious but is 
indistinguishable from its signified and is made conscious through the interpreted 
word.  Through the sonnets above the Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets has allowed 
the reader into his own organization of personal associations and recollections of 
transience and loss causing them to resonate and interact with the reader’s own.  
The metaphors used in the sonnets above, which relate to transience and loss are 
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not about the immediate future or about-to-have.  They are about the past present, 
having had and losing what has been had, “But weep to have, that which it fears to 
lose.”(64.14). The Poet’s ingenuity in re-presenting what has been lost or thing 
presentations through the consciousness of the language of his poetry is a way of 
averting future loss.  The loss through metaphor and metonymy has been made 
conscious and therefore has been understood.  The word is conscious and in being 
conscious there is no longer a need to compulsively repeat what remains 
unconscious as the thing because it has been understood through the metaphor or 
word.  “Where id was there shall ego be.” (Freud. S.E.XX11.80). 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…love is not love” 
Sonnet 116. 2. 
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This thesis has presented the view that the Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets both in 
his plays and in his sonnets offers a view of life as it is lived as opposed to an 
idealized view of life as it ‘should be’ or we would like it to be lived. The 
Shakespearean sonnets present a view of life that is equivocal, inconsistent, and 
self-contradictory and this is because ambivalence indecision and self-doubt 
corresponds to the way life is experienced in the real world. 
 
Socially, small closed communities where meaning is shared no longer constitute the 
contemporary world; rather the contemporary world includes a polarity of cultures, 
social groups, and even people within one closed social community all of whom hold 
divergent viewpoints and meanings even of the same thing.  The irreconcilable 
differences even within one social and historical context serves to challenge the 
concept that meaning is created either by the syntactic, historical or social context in 
which a word falls.  Likewise Dollimore and Sinfield 1985 and Drakakis 1995 xcv 
challenged the view that held that a historical context like the Elizabethan era was 
constituted by a shared well-ordered cosmos where there was an unquestioning 
belief and obedience to ordained law.  Furthermore it is not just a matter of irony in 
conversation where a person can say one thing but mean quite another; irony and 
contradiction can effect an entire personality.  Empson noted this divided personality 
in Seven Types of Ambiguity (2004.293)xcvi   He identified opposites as a sign of 
conflict in the mind of the Poet but he qualifies this by writing,  
 
“Of course, conflict need not be expressed overtly as contradiction, but it is 
likely that those theories of aesthetics which regard poetry as the resolution of 
conflict will find their illustrations chiefly in the limited field covered by the 
seventh type.” 
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 Winnicott in Communicating and Not Communicating Leading to a Study of Certain 
Opposites (1963. 184)xcvii comments that a split or conflict in the mind is part of 
health, 
 
“I am postulating that in the healthy (mature, that is, in respect of the 
development of object-relating) person there is a need for something that 
corresponds to the state of the split person in whom one part of the split 
communicates silently with subjective objects.” (1963.184).   
 
The Poet of Shakespeare’s sonnets articulates a similar opinion, “I think good 
thoughts, whilst others write good words,” (85.4) and, “Me for my dumb thoughts, 
speaking in effect.” (85.14). In our contemporary era of simulation, mass-
communication and disenchantment it is accepted that the process of ironic re-
reading reveals that a text may mean something other than what it explicitly says.  In 
the view held here, all Shakespeare’s sonnets, “Even those that said I could not love 
you dearer,” (115.2) articulate irony.  
 
  
In this thesis the view is held that irony, contradiction of opposites, paradox, 
oxymoron, antimetabole and chiasmus are all figures of speech, which voice one 
thing while meaning another.  This attitude of skepticism and mistrust adopted by the 
Poet in his sonnets effects not only himself but the Loved-object of whom he writes, 
for instance, “Thou blind fool love, what dost thou to mine eyes, (137.1).   “They 
know what beauty is, see where it lies, / Yet what the best is, take the worst to be.” 
(137. 3-4) and, “Therefore I lie with her, and she with me, / And in our faults by lies 
we flattered be.”  (138. 13-14) and again, “For sweetest things turn sourest by their 
deeds, / Lilies that fester, smell far worse than weeds.” (94.13-14) and finally “But 
what’s so blessed fair that fears no blot, / Thou mayst be false, and yet I know it not” 
(92. 13-14).  Abrams in Orientation of Critical theories quotes Samuel Johnson who 
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wrote that the Shakespearean Poet in his sonnets and plays reflects a world-view 
that is, “ the mirror of life and of inanimate nature as well;” (1953.15).  However, the 
tone adopted by Johnson would in the contemporary world-view be viewed as 
didactic and more an instance of what ‘should be’ rather than ‘what is’.  Johnson 
goes on to write,  “The end of writing is to instruct: the end of poetry is to instruct by 
pleasing…. If a poem fails to please whatever its character otherwise, it is, as a work 
of art, nothing;”.  Johnson adopts a moralistic tone and goes on to insist, “it must 
please without violating the standards of truth and virtue” (1953.15).xcviii  
 
 
Irony, paradox, ambiguity challenge the notion of received wisdom and in this thesis 
some of the Poet’s sonnets have been selected to amplify this viewpoint.  In the first 
instance this final chapter examines the method by which this research has been 
carried out in relation to its foundation, which is the literary analysis of the 
Shakespearean sonnets relative to the Freudian analysis of the dream.  This chapter 
then reconsiders some of the themes that arise from selected sonnets in this thesis, 
which portray paradox.  It then goes on to discuss the way in which the Poet of 
Shakespeare’s sonnets through the use of rhetorical strategies of hyperbole, 
chiasmus and oxymoron ironically treats the over-exaggerated idealized or 
denigrated theme of love within a sonnet and between sonnets.  This final chapter 
concludes by reviewing the Freudian notion of negation and disavowal in sonnets like,       
“Let me not to the marriage of true minds” (116.1.) and ends with a short passage 
from one of the Poet’s plays which supports a consistent simple straightforward view 
of love which contradicts the theme of ambivalence laid down in this thesis yet 
contrarily resonates with the reader because it feels emotionally convincing and is 
not open to ambiguity. 
The introduction of this thesis particularized paradox, and elaborated the way in 
which a poem’s meaning is indeterminate and open to a range of interpretation 
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between the orthodox received opinion and sedition in much the same way as does 
the dream. This is because in the dream and in the Poet’s sonnets there is not only a 
slippage in Psychoanalytic terms rather than Saussurian terms between the signifier 
or the manifest reading of the poem and its signified or the latent interpreted meaning 
but also because a Shakespearean sonnet and a play at one and the same time 
articulates a paradox, ‘this is’ and ‘this is not’.  Reading only the manifest level would 
yield a false interpretation as illuminated in Sonnet 43, which was examined in the 
Introduction of this thesis.  This ambiguity, which articulates ‘it is’ and ‘it is not’ 
includes, Twelfth Night which calls gender into question.  This is apparent when 
Sebastion comments to Olivio on her marriage,” You are betrothed both to a maid 
and man.” (5.1.266)xcix and again in Troilus and Cressida, “Without revolt! This is and 
is not Cressid.”(5.2.149)c or in Sonnet 20 the loved-object ‘is’ and ‘is not’ female or ‘is’ 
and ‘is not’ male.    
 
 
In addition to this doubleness the Poet makes use of rhetorical strategies such as 
oxymoron and chiasmus within a line but also contrasts the meaning between lines in 
a single sonnet and opposes the meaning between the first three quatrains and the 
couplet. This is evident in the first line of Sonnet 36, “Let me confess that we two 
must be twain” (36.1) and the couplet of the same sonnet, “But do not so, I love thee 
in such sort, / As thou being mine, mine is thy good report.” (36.13-14).  Moreover, 
the poet holds several differing views on one theme and this became evident in many 
poems. The divergent views held by the Poet arise not only because of the difference 
between the normative view of love and the Poet’s actualized experience of love but 
also because emotions are capricious and colour the way the Poet perceives the 
world.  This unpredictability creates conflict in the Poet’s poetry,  “Mine eye and heart 
are at a mortal war, / How to divide the conquest of thy sight,” (46.1-2).   
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Freud was intensely suspicious of the claims that morality or the normatively 
determined view make on us and this informed his view that the Ego itself was 
conflicted.  The Ego according to Freud is like a sycophant who is besieged by 
contradictory claims and who tries to please the Id, the Super-ego and external 
reality simultaneously, “helpless in both directions, the ego defends itself vainly, alike 
against the instigations of the murderous id and against the reproaches of the 
punishing conscience” (1923. p.f.l. 11. 395).  Freud concluded that the Ego and the 
id are more like the horse and rider, “Thus in its relation to the id it is like a man on 
horseback, who has to hold in check the superior strength of the horse;”.. “often a 
rider, if he is not to be parted from his horse, is obliged to guide it where it wants to 
go; so in the same way the ego is in the habit of transforming the id’s will into action 
as if it were its own” (1923. p.f.l. 11. 364)ci.  Freud writes in Civilization and its 
Discontents (S.E. XX1.64-149) cii  when it comes to the demands of morality and 
civilization, the Superego is portrayed as a faculty of surveillance and punishment 
keeping people on the straight and narrow.  If anything the Superego is on this 
characterization, an enforcer of pretense and simulation.  It has the contradictory 
structure of ‘no’ to the ids ‘yes’ or ‘it is not’ to the ids ‘it is.’  The guilty unhappy 
discontented individual thereby manages a civilized life a life of social pretense or 
what Winnicott termed the differentiation between the True and False self in the 
healthy individual.  In Sonnet 50, the Poet similarly expresses the pull of the id when 
the instinct is forced to do something that goes against its grain, “The beast that 
bears me, tired with my woe, / Plods dully on, to bear that weight in me, (50.5-6) but 
contradictorily the opposite is also true, “In winged speed no motion shall I know, / 
Then can no Horse with my desire keep pace,” (51.8-9).   
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A key-stone of this thesis is that the poem like all art resembles Freud’s 
psychoanalytic concept of the dreamciii  This occurs because many of the sonnets 
are seditious and like the dream the manifest content is disguised to allow the latent 
subversive meaning to evade the morality of the Super-ego or moral conscience.  To 
effect this distortion of meaning both sonnet and dream employ unconscious 
processes of condensation civ  and displacement (S.E. V. 4, 305) and indirect 
representation (1917. S.E.14.228)cv  but whereas dreams and visual art create a 
symbol of life a poem goes through the process of secondary elaboration  which, 
“reconstitutes the elements of the dream so that the manifest content has some 
semblance or façade of logic and coherence” which is created by word pictures or 
metaphor (S.E. V. 666).  Furthermore from the discussion of the relationship between 
the sonnets and dream it seems that both sonnets and the dream share an ambiguity 
of meaning, which make both the poems and the interpretation of a dream 
indeterminate.  
 
 
The method of analysis in this thesis has been to go initially from observation.  To 
begin with this involved the repetitive reading and listening to an auditory taped 
recording of each sonnet.  Following on from this the whole cycle of sonnets were 
continually read and listened to.  Thereafter sonnet themes seemed to fall naturally 
into a pre-conscious template generated by Psychoanalysis.  Next sonnets were 
categorized in themes according to a psychoanalytic classification.  Each sonnet 
within a sonnet grouping was then glossed according to the literary interpretations 
offered by Booth (1977) cviii.  The literary analysis 
was then related to the psychoanalytic method of analyzing a dream. 
cvi Burrow (2002)cvii Duncan-Jones
 In the analysis 
of a dream the whole dream is broken down into parts and each part is then 
interpreted according to the psychoanalytic method detailed in chapter 1. The same 
method was applied to the analysis of the poetry but contrarily to the analysis of the 
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dream a literary perspective was applied to the analysis of the poetry rather than a 
psychoanalytic perspective.  No attempt was made to impose literary theory or 
psychoanalytic theory onto individual sonnets for in Freudian terms this would have 
been viewed as Wild Psycho-Analysis (1910. 351-356). cix   Rather literary  and 
psychoanalytic theory was only applied to part of the poem or the whole poem if it 
was seen to dovetail with the deductions and inference made from the analysis of the 
observed material of each individual poem.   
 
 
In the Introduction to this thesis the psychoanalytic interpretation of the unconscious 
was discussed and through the writing of this thesis literary analysis was seen to be 
comparable to psychoanalytic analysis.   Freud regarded dream analysis, which he 
laid down in his Interpretation of Dreams (1900. S.E. IV. 169-200) and in his lectures 
on the Unconscious (1915) as parallel to literary analysis as both make use of word-
play or puns, metaphor and metonymy, verbal allusion, timelessness, negation, 
antithetical meanings of words, dissecting the narrative content of the dream or poem, 
symbolism and allegorical or mythical meaning.  Freud viewed the creativity of the 
dream-work to the creation of metaphor.  Metaphor like the dream implies the 
comparison and synthesizing of two unlike things, which actually have something in 
common or the juxtaposition of contradictory ideas, which together become 
meaningful.  Conversely metonymy in the dream makes use of part of an object to 
represent the whole or the whole object to represent a part.  The core of the 
interpretation of a dream is the method of applying the dreamer’s free association to 
parts of the dream in the understanding of the whole dream.  The essence of this 
free association is metonymy as free association combines ideas that are free-
flowing and contiguous. “Creativity” writes Freud, “is no longer the exclusive preserve 
of the divinely inspired or the few great poets, for, from a psychoanalytic point of view 
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everyone is poetic because everyone dreams in metaphor and generates symbolic 
meaning in the process of living”(1900a.).   
 
 
Mortality is foregrounded in Chapter 2 This defence against the temporariness and 
ephemerality of life manifests in a conflict between the virtuous behaviour of altruism 
as opposed to the id’s self interest.  According to the Poet both the aspiration to 
“never die” (1.2) and the aspiration to preserve the self at the expense of the other 
“To eat the world’s due,” (1.14) are found by the Poet to be unachievable.  By 
contrast the desire for the immortalization of beauty is found to be attainable in the 
symbolic beauty about the love-object in the Poet’s poetry, “So long as men can 
breathe or eyes can see, / So long lives this, and this gives life to thee,” (18.13-14) 
and “Thou shouldst print more, not let that copy die.” (11.14).   
 
 
Chapter 3 concentrated on the arbitrary link between both the Saussurian and 
Psychoanalytic signifier and signified and highlights Sonnet 135 and 136 to elaborate 
this point.  Within these two sonnets the Poet presents his name in the form of a joke 
or a witty play on words and in so doing he subverts the meaning of his name and 
the conventional meaning of love through the use of a joke or pun that exploit the 
different possible signifiers of his name “Will” (135.1).  This humour tends to disguise 
the erotic connotations he gives to his name.  In this fashion he protects the honour 
of his literary reputation within the puritanical context of the Super-ego within the 
socio-cultural period of that time.  Different psychic processes are used in the making 
of a joke to those of the creation of a dream. In a dream there is a compromise 
between reality and phantasy which colours objectivity with a subjective hue.  
Conversely in Freud’s theory of Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905. 
p.f.l. 6)cx  the contradiction between the preconscious and unconscious is retained 
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and both conscious and unconscious signifiers appear simultaneously in the manifest 
joke.   The theory behind the rhetorical concept of oxymoron or the juxtaposition of 
two words which are opposites but which together create a truth is highlighted in 
Freud’s theory of the Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words (S.E. X1.1910.157 )cxi  In 
this lecture Freud makes the case that the German word for ‘strong’ intrinsically 
contains within it its opposite meaning ‘weak’ as does the word ‘light’ contain the 
meaning of ‘dark’ within it.  The same is true of compound words such as ‘far-near’ 
and ‘outside-inside’.  Freud accords this to the primitive processes involved in the 
unconscious for in this system there is no negation so that what is negative can 
equally be thought of as positive.  It is this equivocation that illuminates a truth 
embedded in oxymoron as it resonates with the ambivalence found within the reader. 
 
 
In chapter 4, loss is discussed.  Loss implies symbolization for without the capacity to 
accept loss there can be no language as words or symbols stand in place of the lost 
or absent object.   Furthermore, without the acceptance of the loss of the loved 
object there can be no reality testing because the reproduction of a perception as a 
presentation or representation arises from the capacity to bring before the mind once 
more something that has once been perceived by reproducing it as representation 
without the external object having still to be there.  The precondition then for setting 
up of reality testing is that, “objects shall have been lost which once brought real 
satisfaction.” (1925.p.f.l. 11.440).  Many of the sonnets are about love, but rather 
than describe this love the Poet details his impotency and despondency in not being 
able to capture all the loveliness in both art and nature before it is destroyed by those 
instruments of ruin and annihilation like time, insincerity, nature, human rage and 
human and natural destruction.  Whereas mourning is the reaction to loss where the 
world is experienced as becoming poorer, melancholia or depression is a narcissistic 
loss to the Ego itself, which becomes impoverished.  As a defence against loss the 
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old love is transferred on to a new object and this is interpreted through Freud’s 
theory of Mourning and Melancholia (1917. p.f.l.11.245-269) and in Analysis 
Terminable and Interminable (1937. S.E. XX111.209-205).cxii In these lectures, Freud 
understands, if the reason for the loss is not comprehended the loss is repeated.   
 
 
Some of the descriptions of love and beauty presented by the Poet are equivocal and 
contradictory.  For instance in Sonnet 87 the Poet writes about love as an illusion, 
“Thus have I had thee as a dream doth flatter, / In sleep a King, but waking no such 
matter.” (87.13-14). In Sonnet 87, the Poet questions his own hyperbole, “Who will 
believe my verse in time to come” (17.1).  In Sonnet 115, the Poet questions his own 
judgment, “Those lines that I before have writ do lie, / Even those that said I could 
not love you dearer,” (115.1-2).  Furthermore, the comparison between a sonnet like 
Sonnet 21 and Sonnets 127, 130 and 132 amplifies the notion of irony if not mock 
encomia.  On the one hand Sonnet 127, 130, and 132 appear to mock the mindless 
mechanical application of the Petrarchan-like over-blown metaphorical descriptions 
of love referred to in Sonnet 21,  
 
“Stirr’d by a painted beauty to his verse,   
Who heaven it self for ornament doth use,  
And every fair with his fair doth rehearse, 
Making a couplement of proud compare 
With Sun and Moon, with earth and sea’s rich gems:” (21.2-6).  
  
In light and in line with the oblique reference to the hyperbole and pretentious 
comparisons in Petrarchan sonnets, Sonnet 127, 130, and 132 appear to be a mock 
encomia, where praise is lavished on “black” (127.1) which was at that time 
conventionally regarded as implying ugly, ‘But is profan’d, if not lives in disgrace.” 
(127.8) and again,  “In the old age black was not counted fair, / Or if it were it bore 
not beauty’s name:” (127.1-2). The reader is left in wonder in a space of indecision of 
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where [moral] truth or even the Poet’s own truth lies.  Here, the trope does not lie in 
the substitution of the opposing word, but in the expression of an opposite sentiment 
or idea so that on the surface it appears that praise is intended.  This becomes 
apparent through the insertion of “My” (130.12) and, “And yet by heaven I think my 
love as rare / As any she belied with false compare.” (130.13-14).  Notwithstanding at 
the latent interpreted meaning this praise implies derision through the use of 
metaphors such as “dun” (130.3) and the choice of the pronoun “some” in “some 
perfumes” (130,7) which suggests that all perfumes are not sweet smelling, “some” 
(130.7) perfumes like the one on the Poet’s mistress’s breath “reeks” (130.8) 
indicating foul smelling.  Sonnets 127, 130 and 132 may also be understood as a 
satire or mock encomia on the follies of women wearing make-up to beautify 
themselves in order to deceive the world, “Fairing the foul with Art’s false borrow’d 
face” (127.6).    
In Sonnet 116 the Poet presents love as a contradiction of its own premise “… love is 
not love” (116.2).  According to Booth (1977.389) cxiii  Sonnet 116 is the most 
universally admired of the Shakespearean Sonnets, “ the more one thinks about this 
grand, noble absolute convincing gesture, the less there seems to be of it” .  Booth 
continues that it is a “high sounding energetic nonsense that addresses its topic but 
does not indicate what is being said about it”.  The reader comes away from it 
wondering in what sense love has been made credible or concrete or something that 
is actually experienced with which the reader can identify.   The first line, “Let me not 
to the marriage of true minds” takes its morality from Ephesians 5: 14-16. “Be very 
careful, then, how you live —not as unwise but as wise, 16 making the most of every 
opportunity, because the days are evil”.  Unlike metaphor which makes a comparison 
between two unlike things, irony invokes an absent or hidden sense and it this 
absence that results from the explicit sense of negation that opens the poem,  “.. love 
is not love”(116.2).  The straightforward statement if taken literally implies a paradox 
that contradicts its own assertion but gives no clue as to what genuine love is and as 
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such the puffed up words appear empty, vague and meaningless.  “Similarly” writes 
Booth  “the hyperbole of the couplet is so extreme that it merely vouches for the 
speakers intensity of feeling – it gives no evidence to support the validity of his 
statement because on a literal level it is ridiculous as we cannot doubt what has been 
written” (1977.389).  The comparison in itself is illogical because there is no 
commonality between the different act of writing and the experience of love.   
 
 
From a Freudian (1925.p.f.l. 11. 438) perspective the negation “..love is not love” is a 
way of taking notice of what has been repressed.  What has been repressed is the 
opposite of love’s steadfast commitment as it is espoused in the sonnet; indeed 
according to the Poet’s own poetry, love is irresolute, uncertain, false, “In loving thee 
thou know’st I am forsworn, / But thou art twice forsworn to me love swearing,” (152. 
1-2).  In these sonnets and possibly in life love as it is experienced cannot be named, 
“Or if it were it bore not beauty’s name:” (127.2). If it cannot be consciously named it 
cannot be thought about (1915. p.f.l.11. 201-210).  Likewise, to negate something in 
judgement is according to Freud (1925.p.f.l .438), “at bottom to say this is something 
which I should prefer to repress.”  The repression of an idea involves the splitting of 
idea and its concomitant emotion.  The elided idea is repressed and the emotion is 
suppressed.  The lifting of repression implies reconnecting the idea and emotion 
corresponding to it.  The idea that is repressed and omitted in the grandiloquence of 
Sonnet 116 is the actual lived-experience of love.  This elision gives to Sonnet 116 
an ironic meaning and an ungrounded insincere emptiness for in all its excess of 
high-sounding phrases which advocate love there is no counterbalancing 
contradictory statement which espouses what the experience of love actually feels 
like.  On the one hand it states “love is not love” (116.2) but on the other it does not 
declare what love is.  This is similar to the interpretation of only the manifest dream 
or signifier.  If the interpretation of the manifest dream was taken to represent the 
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whole dream, the interpretation would be viewed as flawed or unbalanced. This is 
especially salient when this negation of love is contradicted by the monosyllabic 
simplicity and emotional real-lived experience of the Poet’s own words in Much ado 
about Nothing which create a sense of credibility and truth, 
 
Benedick  “..And now tell me, how doth your cousin? 
Beatrice Very Ill 
Benedick And how do you 
Beatrice  Very ill too. 
PBenedick  Serve God, love me, and mend. 
 
      William Shakespeare. 
Much Ado About Nothing. (Act. 4. Sc.2. 315-324)cxiv. 
 
 
In this way the Poet grounds and nominates love as concern for the other and 
through the use of the verb “mend” links love to healing, recovery and being made 
whole.  The Poet relates the sense in the verb “mend” to God whatever the reader 
conceives God to be. 
  
 
This thesis has examined the contradictions in the poetry of Shakespeare’s sonnets 
and related the literary analysis of the sonnets to Freud’s study of the creation, 
contradictions and interpretation of the dream. The sonnets feel emotionally 
convincing to us because they respond to the reader’s own ambivalent, contradictory 
and divided nature. 
 
41.480 words with citations included. 
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